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INTRODUCTION
After a slow start in the 1980s, the activity of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ("Court" or "IACHR") rapidly increased
during the 1990s. While the American Convention on Human Rights
("American Convention") establishing the Court entered into force in

BA(Hons) LLB(Hons (Syd), D.Phil Candidate and Tutor in International Law,
University of Oxford.
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1978,' the Court did not decide the first contentious case involving
an individual complaint against state violence until 1988, seven years
after the filing of the petition and ten years after the creation of the
Court. 2 The Velcisquez Rodriguez case involved forced
disappearances and breaches of numerous Convention rights in
Honduras.3 Prior to this landmark case, between 1979 and 1981, the
Inter-American Commission submitted no contentious cases to the
Court and requested no advisory opinions.4 While a cooperative
relationship existed between the Commission and the Court after
1986, significant growth in reparations cases coming before the
Court did not occur until the 1990s.
This paper examines the reparations decisions of the Court in
cases involving violations of the right to life between 1988 and 2002.

1. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, General Information
(explaining that the Court adopted the American Convention at the Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Human Rights, held November 7 through November
at
Rica),
Costa
Jose,
in
San
1969
22,
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/iachr/general.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
The Court entered into force on July 18, 1978. Id.
2. See Velsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) (proceeding to the Court upon submission by the InterAmerican Commission and asserting violations to the right to life and the right to
personal liberty established under the American Convention), available at
http://wwwl.urnn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11-12d.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
The American Convention established the Court and the Inter-American
Commission as the twin pillars of human rights supervision and enforcement.
Comprised of seven judges from OAS member states, the Court exercises both
contentious and advisory jurisdiction. See American Convention on Human Rights,
July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 139, art. 62(3), 64
[hereinafter American Convention] (establishing that the Court's jurisdiction
extends to cases involving the interpretation and application of the Convention's
provisions and that the Court has the authority to offer opinions regarding the
compatibility of domestic laws with international conventions and protocols),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
3. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, paras. 24 (outlining that the case involved claims against Honduran officials for illegal
detentions, torture, and disappearances of people).
4. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12
HUM. RTS. Q. 439, 451 (1990) (stating that in response to the Commission's first
request for an advisory opinion, the Court announced that the Commission, unlike
OAS members, enjoyed an absolute right to request such an opinion within the
framework of the Convention).
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Article 4(1) of the American Convention recognizes and protects the
universal human right to life stating: "Every person has the right to
have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life." 5
The Court has ruled on numerous occasions that states must make
reparations for state violations of the right to life. 6 This paper draws
out the key principles of reparation for unlawful death established by
the case law of the Court, placing these developments in regional
Inter-American law alongside the established principles of
international law. It first examines state responsibility for unlawful
death and the general principles of reparation that are applicable; 7 the
paper then focuses specifically on monetary compensation as the
most common form of reparation in unlawful death cases.8 It then
considers the multiple heads of compensation that the Court has
awarded, including material damages, moral damages, expenses and
costs, and the emerging concepts of "nuclear family patrimonial
damages" and "damage to a life plan." 9 Finally, it compares the
compensation amounts awarded during the period of analysis,
arguing that the Court has become more generous over time both
compared to its own previous awards and compared to the awards of
other international tribunals, including the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR") and the U.N. Compensation Commission

5. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4(1).
6. See, e.g., Trujillo Oroza Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 92, para. 60

(establishing the Court's jurisdiction under the codified common law of state
responsibility to order the responsible state to pay reparations and citing several
examples of cases in which the Court ordered such reparations, including the
Cantoral Benavides Case, the Cesti Hurtado Case, and the "Street Children"
Case).
7. See discussion infra Part A-B (discussing the international law principles

behind the Court's reparation system).
8. See discussion infra Part C.1 (outlining the international law allowing

compensation as reparation for unlawful death).
9. See discussion infra Part C.2 (explaining how the Court determines what

kind of damages to award and what factors are considered in the determination).
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("UNCC"). 10 This paper shows that the regional human rights law
developed by the Court has made and continues to make significant
jurisprudential contributions to the established international law on
compensation for unlawful death.

I. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNLAWFUL
DEATH
Historically, customary international law of state responsibility has
held states internationally responsible for the unlawful death of
foreigners within their jurisdiction perpetrated by, or at the direction
of, a state official acting within the scope, or apparent scope, of his
or her authority." States also are responsible for failing to take
adequate measures to prevent unlawful death or injury caused by
agents of the state12 or non-state actors within their jurisdiction. 3
Indeed, as Whiteman writes, "The responsibility under international
law is not ordinarily for the act of committing the murder but for the
wrong that the respondent state has committed in failing to take
sufficiently adequate steps to prevent that act or to apprehend or

10. See discussion infra Part D (noting that the Court awards compensation
amounts as an aggregate of all the rights violated, rather than amounts for each
violation, and these compensation amounts have been rising since 1989).
11. See, e.g., Caire Case (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 516 (1929) (holding that
forces under the command of officers are sufficient proof of the state's direct
responsibility and that a pending domestic case does not preclude the international
tribunal from exercising jurisdiction); Youmans Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A.
110 (1926) (holding Mexico responsible for the death of Youmans as a result of
the military's failure to protect the American from a mob). See generally
MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 639 (U.S. Govt.
Printing Office, 1937) (explaining that a state has international responsibility for
injury to an alien for its failure to prevent, apprehend or punish the person who
injured the alien).
12. See Yeager v. Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 92 (1987) (concluding that it
is a generally accepted principle of international law to hold states responsible for
actions by people exercising elements of government authority or acting on behalf
of the state).
13. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 639 (clarifying that a person who
commits a crime is not chargeable under international law while a state that fails to
take the necessary precautions to apprehend and to punish the criminal is).
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punish the murderer."' 4 Put simply, the internationally wrongful act
must cause the individual's death.' 5 Whiteman notes further:
Not every case involving the death of a national in a foreign country may
properly be made the basis of an international claim by the state of which
the deceased was a national. A state is not required
6 to guarantee the life,
limb or property of the aliens who visit its shores.'

Accordingly, there is no responsibility for the common murder of
a foreign national by private persons. There must be some act or
omission by the state, such as a failure to investigate, apprehend,
prosecute, or punish, 7 or some other fault, negligence, bad faith,
malfeasance, lack of diligence, or defective administration of
justice. 8 States are responsible for disappearances involving state
14. Id.
15. See id. at 659 (citing Cora Kessler, a case in which the U.S.-Germany
Mixed Claims Commission refused a claim by the victim's spouse because the
victim's death was due to an enlarged liver and not from injuries sustained by the
wrongful sinking of the Lusitania).
16. Id. at 651.
17. See, e.g., Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1926) (holding the
Mexican government liable for not adequately prosecuting the murderer of Janes,
despite eyewitnesses and the local police's knowledge of the murderer's location);
Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Miles to Earl Granville (Feb. 9, 1882), in 73 BRIT.
AND FOREIGN ST. PAPERS, 1881-82, at 695 (Sir Edward Hertslet & Edward Cecil
Hertslet, eds., 1889) (detailing the process by which the British government
requested the execution of two Arabs accused of killing a British crew member
aboard a British ship to the Sultan of Zanzibar, despite the Sultan's refusal to
investigate the situation, try the accused, or offer reparations to Great Britain);
Francis Case (Gr. Brit. v. Mex.), 5 R.I.A.A. 99 (1931) (ruling that the execution of
Mr. Francis' murderers demonstrated that the Mexican government did not fail to
investigate or otherwise fulfill its responsibilities); Kidd Case (Gr. Brit. v. Mex.), 5
R.I.A.A. 41 (1931) (holding the British government responsible for damages for
the murder of William Kidd by a band of men); Fraser Case (Gr. Brit. v. Mex.), 5
R.I.A.A. 275 (1931) (disallowing the claim because, after the murder of Mr. Fraser
by bandits, the Mexican government sent fifty troops to investigate and track the
bandits, ultimately leading to their execution).
18. See, e.g., Home Frontier & Foreign Missionary Society of the United
Brethren in Christ (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6 R.I.A.A. 42 (1920) (holding that because
the British government quickly suppressed a rebellion that resulted in damage to
the Mission's property and death of missionaries, it did not violate its international
responsibility); Noyes Case (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R.I.A.A. 308 (1933) (finding that the
general failure to maintain order and prevent crimes is insufficient to demonstrate a
specific failure of duty with regard to the injury of Mr. Noyes by a drunken
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officials or agents, such as where a person is taken into official
custody and is found murdered, 9 and for deaths in custody due to the
non-treatment of illness. 2° Once an unlawful death has occurred,

states are further responsible for failing to investigate properly,
apprehend, or punish the perpetrator of a killing.2'
There is, however, no international responsibility for accidental
death. 2 Nor is there responsibility for the acts of revolutionaries
opposing the sovereign authority, except where the authorities fail to
use prompt and appropriate force to suppress the insurrection or fail
to provide an appropriate level of protection for foreign interests.23
State responsibility will not normally exist where the deceased
"provoked the trouble that resulted in his death" 24 or contributed

crowd); Mecham Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 440 (1929) (holding the
municipal president liable for his refusal to aid in capturing those who robbed and
murdered Lucian Mecham who were located on a ranch within the president's
municipality); Munroe Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 538 (1929) (allowing the
claim for responsibility for the Mexican government's failure to protect against
mob violence).
19. See Quintanilla Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 101 (1926) (holding the
United States responsible for the murder of Quintanilla while he was in police
custody).
20. See Turner Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 278 (1927) (holding the
Mexican government liable for the death of Turner, who died of an illness that
worsened and remained untreated during Turner's two-month illegal detention).
21. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 639 (explaining that cases claiming
liability for the payment of indemnity under international law typically involve
situations where the foreign state failed to act adequately against the criminal
perpetrator rather than cases arising from a government official's criminal actiofi).
22. See Cadenhead Case (Gr. Brit. V. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 40 (1914) (disallowing
a claim for the accidental death of Cadenhead, who was shot dead by a U.S. soldier
negligently attempting to stop a fleeing prisoner).
23. See Sambiaggio Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 499 (1903) (deciding
that the Venezuelan government was not responsible for repaying money that
revolutionaries extorted from Sambiaggio because acts of revolutionaries are
outside of the government's control); see also Asian Agric. Prod. v. Sri Lanka, 30
I.L.M. 577 (1991) (ruling that the Sri Lankan government was liable for damage to
a shrimp farm and deaths of employees when the government failed to take due
diligence in launching attacks against insurgents); Short v. Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 16
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 103 (1987) (holding that a revolutionary government is
responsible for the acts of the overthrown government, and for its own acts as a
revolutionary movement prior to taking power).
24.

WHITEMAN,

supra note 11, at 658.
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significantly towards it. The state's obligations to protect foreign
nationals also may vary according to the circumstances, taking into
account matters such as the voluntary risk assumed in being present
in a certain location (for example, in the midst of avoidable civil
strife), or the resources available for policing in developing
countries.25
International responsibility arises from the unlawful death of a
foreign national within a state's jurisdiction.26 States are responsible
for unlawful deaths not only through territorial jurisdiction, but
arising from any exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction as well. For
example, State A may be held responsible if its naval forces cause the
deaths of civilian nationals of State B on the high seas, as occurred in
the numerous Lusitania cases decided by the U.S.-Germany Mixed
27
Claims Commission.
In traditional law, state responsibility for unlawful death arises
where there is a breach of an international obligation owed to other
states to protect foreign nationals. In such cases, the victim's state
has sovereign discretion both to exercise diplomatic protection on
behalf of its national and to conduct the claim and distribution of any
award. 28 As Whelton notes, "the law of international claims has been
at the forefront of human rights law, providing greater protection to
foreigners abroad than many individuals can still expect as citizens in

25. See Home Frontier & Foreign Missionary Society of the United Brethren in
Christ (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6 R.I.A.A. 42, 44 (1920) (ruling that the missionaries
assumed the risk that the indigenous people could rebel when they chose to live in
and expose themselves to the dangers of Sierra Leone).
26. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 639 (clarifying that domestic law may
separately allow compensation for the death of a foreign national without prejudice
to the international law claim).
27. See MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS & OPINIONS
OF A GENERAL NATURE: OPINIONS IN INDIVIDUAL LUSITANIA CLAIMS AND OTHER

CASES

195, 208-09 (Gov't Printing Off. 1925) [hereinafter

LUSITANIA CLAIMS]

(explaining that Germany was obligated to pay compensation for damages caused
to Americans through German acts).
28. See Administrative Decision No. V (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 119, 119
(1924) (stating that the United States was the only nation entitled to assert the
claims of the contract violation and that it also retains the right to decline to press
charges when the American national who was injured by the foreign state
voluntarily transfers alliance to another nation).
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their own country. ' 29 Nevertheless, a national possesses no
enforceable right to require the state to exercise protection on his or
her behalf. Rather, the state asserts its own rights through its
nationals.3 ° Indeed, the victim's state may choose to decline to
exercise diplomatic protection for a variety of self-interested
political, economic, military, or diplomatic reasons.3
International human rights law significantly expands the
traditional law of state responsibility. Previously, international law
necessarily required states "to establish that the person claiming to
have suffered a pecuniary loss is a national of the claimant state as a
condition precedent to the establishment of an internationally valid
claim. 32 Now, in principle, any state may seek to hold another state
internationally responsible, under treaty or custom, for causing the
death of anyone - national or foreigner - in violation of the law of
nations.33 Claims no longer depend on the exercise of diplomatic
protection on behalf of nationals. 34 This possibility is particularly
compelling in relation to human rights norms owed erga omnes.35 In
29. Carmel Whelton, The United Nations Compensation Commission and
InternationalLaw: A Fresh Approach, 25 OTTAWA L. REV. 607, 611 (1993).
30. See Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No.
15, at 95 (defining the rule that only the state can exercise diplomatic protection,
unless there is a special agreement that does not allow the state to extend
diplomatic protection over its nationals).
31. See, e.g., David Bederman, The UnitedNations Compensation Commission
and the Tradition of InternationalClaims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1, 25 (1995) (explaining that the Mavromattis Palestine Concessions Case,
originally a claim between a businessman and an administrator, resulted in a
dispute between Great Britain and Greece and illustrates the point that such
international disputes can exacerbate diplomatic tensions rather than resolve the
original disputes).
32. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 641.
33. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (explaining that traditional inter-state responsibilities
of international law do not match the objectives of the human rights establishment
because human rights violations generally cause indirect injury to the state whereas
breaches of treaty obligations cause direct injury to the state).
34. See id. at 48 (describing how the International Law Commission has
expanded the definition of "injured state" with the effect that in cases of a breach
of obligation, every state party to the convention is considered an injured state).
35. See id. (noting that in fact, human rights obligations are obligations erga
omnes, giving all states the right to defend them).
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practice, states seldom pursue such claims, either out of fear of
potential reciprocity of claims or because states may not consider
human rights breaches as serious injuries to the state itself.36
Consequently, while the classical framework of state responsibility
remains intact - a state owes its international obligation to protect the
human right to life multilaterally to other states and not to
individuals - the beneficiaries of the rules of state responsibility have
become primarily individuals rather than states.37 International
human rights law has infused the inter-state paradigm of state
responsibility and international obligations with a new concern and
respect for the individual, irrespective of nationality.38
It is in this context that one must read Article 33 of the
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. 9
While Article 33(1) states that the obligations of a responsible state
"may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the
international community as a whole," 4 Article 33(2) qualifies this by
stating that the Articles are "without prejudice to any right, arising
from the international responsibility of a State, which accrues
directly to any person or entity other than a State."'" Accordingly,
while the international obligation exists only between states, the

36. See id. at 49 (explaining that states are reluctant to accuse other states of

human rights violations, primarily because states may view such accusations as
hostile acts).
37. See Eric Rosand, The Right to Compensation in Bosnia. An Unfulfilled

Promise and a Challenge to InternationalLaw, 33

CORNELL INT'L

L.J. 113, 135

(2000) (detailing that according to the principles of state responsibility, a state is

responsible for all wrongful acts that breach an international obligation and must
provide reparation to the injured party).
38. See id. (stating that the right to live in one's homeland is a prerequisite to

the enjoyment of other human rights and as such, is a human right in itself).
39. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

COMMISSION'S

209 (2002) (discussing the scope and

consequences of the international obligations that states have to persons whose
human rights they have violated).
40. See id. (explaining that the severity of the breach may affect the extent to
which the state is obligated to end the injury against the victim and to compensate
the victim).
41. See id. at 210 (recognizing the possibility that the Court may need to hold

persons or entities other than states responsible for violations of human rights
norms).
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beneficiaries of the obligation may be more numerous and entitled
individually to certain procedural or substantive rights.42
The Inter-American human rights system establishes regional
procedures enabling victims of rights violations to seek redress.43
Article 1(1) of the American Convention requires party-states to
"undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and
to ensure all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination.""
Article 25(1) confers on individuals "the right to simple and prompt
recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or
tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution of laws of the state concerned or by
this Convention," including judicial remedies.45
Only party-states and the Inter-American Commission have the
right to submit cases to the Inter-American Court under Article 61(1)
of the Convention.4 6 Individual, group, or non-governmental
organization complainants may petition the Inter-American
Commission.47 In turn, the Inter-American Commission may refer
the case to the Court if parties cannot reach a friendly settlement and
so long as they have followed certain investigative and reporting

42. See id. at 209 (finding that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations created individual rights that the detainee's national state could
invoke in the International Court of Justice).
43. See American Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. (emphasizing the
importance that people must enjoy freedom from "fear and want" and may only do
so if there are conditions "whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and
cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights").
44. See id. art. 1 (illustrating discrimination in the forms of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political, national origin, social origin, economic status, birth,
or other social conditions).
45. See id. art. 25 (providing that in addition to judicial remedy, state parties
agree to offer a legal system that possesses competent authority to enforce
remedies for the victims).
46. See id. art. 61 (reiterating that state parties must follow specific procedures
before the Court will hear their cases).
47. See id. art. 44 (noting that the party's petition may contain denunciations or
complaints of violations by a state).
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procedures.48 Of course, states must have submitted to the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court.49 Individual petitioners may
appoint legal representatives only in proceedings before the InterAmerican Commission, not the Court.50 Therefore, individuals do not
have direct standing at the international level to enforce the
international human rights obligations of states, notwithstanding that
the states direct those obligations towards protecting individuals. 1
Given that the resource constraints and policy considerations of the
Commission as a kind of public prosecutor may not always coincide
with the interests of the victims, this standing limitation can be
problematic.52 In some cases, for example, the Commission and the
victims' representatives at the reparations phase-the only stage at

48. See id. arts. 48-51 (providing that prior to settlement negotiations and upon
receiving a petition, the Inter-American Commission will: (1) request information
from the state government allegedly responsible for violation; (2) determine
whether grounds exist for the petition of the accusing party; (3) decide whether the
petition is admissible; (4) carry out investigations, when needed; (5) require states
to provide relevant information, receiving oral and written statements, if the
Commission calls for the latter; and (6) make itself available to the parties
involved). Additionally, in cases of friendly settlements, the Inter-American
Commission shall compose a report with a statement of the facts and the solution
reached that the Secretary General of the Organization of American States will
publish. Id.
49. See id. art. 45 (clarifying that for a state to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court, it must have ratified the American Convention and recognized in a formal
declaration the competence of the Commission to consider its petitions).
50. See Dinah Shelton, Remedies in the Inter-American System, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 92ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 202, 205 (American Society of International Law 1998)

(comparing the Inter-American Commission to the European Commission and
noting that while both represent the public interest, the Inter-American
Commission has the added burden of advocating for the victim).
51. See id. (excepting the recent development that individuals may plead before
the Court during the reparations phase of their case).
52. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT 649 (1996) (reporting that the Commission spends a mere US

$400,000 of its approximately US $1,700,000 budget on witness and expert
expenses, preparation of reports, on-site visits, and Commissioner meetings).
While the Inter-American Commission meets for four weeks a year, the European
Court meets for sixteen weeks a year. Id.
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which victims can directly represent themselves-have made quite
different assessments of the quantum of compensation. 3
The procedure for claiming reparation in the Inter-American
system is different than actions in domestic law, where available, for
the enforcement of a human right." In the latter case, the obligation
of the domestic authorities to protect individual human rights gives
rise to a direct relation between the state and the individual; the
individual per se can hold the state responsible. 5 There is arguably
no reason why individuals should possess an international legal
personality or capacity that is more limited than that of states when it
comes to enforcing the specific field of international human rights
obligations.5 6 An insistence on the exhaustion of local remedies
followed by the implementation of a judicial admissibility procedure
before the merits phase, to screen out claims which are prima facie
unmeritorious, can allay any fear of a flood of individual complaints
to the Inter-American Court.57 The Commission could then focus
more selectively and intensively on claims involving legal questions

53. See Castillo Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 75 (1998) (finding that Peru would have to
compensate and reimburse the victim's next of kin only for expenses that he spent
in pursuing the Pdez case to the Peruvian authorities); see also "Street Children"
Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77,
para. 68 (2001) (demanding that the victim's family prove regular financial support
that would have continued if the victim had not died).
54. See United Nations Enable, InternationalNorms and Standards Relating to
Disability (illustrating that most treaty obligations require state government to
guarantee and defend human rights by taking constructive steps to implement
positive measures), at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp103.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2004).
55. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 60 (contrasting earlier Western law that
relied upon Roman law, in which one could only ascribe responsibility for
damages onto individuals, and not onto the state).
56. See id at 52 (arguing that any action states take in addressing human rights
violations have a greater impact than on one individual victim).
57. See id. at 68 (addressing the original remedies that states implement to
guarantee preservation of the law and to rectify the rights of the victim in addition
to the more standard remedies of non-intrusive declaratory judgments, damages,
injunctions, and affirmative orders).

2004]

COMPENSA TION FOR UNLA WFUL DEATH

of particular public policy importance rather than expending its
scarce resources on routine claims involving less complex disputes. 8

II. PRINCIPLES OF REPARATION FOR UNLAWFUL
DEATH
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although not adopted by states in treaty form, the International
Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts ("ILC Articles") are an authoritative
starting point in considering the modern law of reparations. 9 Under
Article 30, a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing, and (b) to
offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.6 °
Article 31 further requires a responsible state to make full reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 61 An injury

is defined as "any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the
internationally wrongful act."62 The possible forms that reparation
may take are set out in Article 34, and include "restitution,
63
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.

58. See id. at 52 (revealing the promotion of compliance with human rights
norms as advancing public policy).
59. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 61 (communicating that the ILC Articles
purport to formulate, by way of codification and progressive development, the
basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of states for their
internationally wrongful acts).
60. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationallywrongful acts,
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third
Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 30, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
at
Draft
Articles],
[hereinafter
(last
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm
visited Feb. 21, 2004). See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 196 (explaining
that these are both aspects of restoration, and they both repair the negative effect of
the violation by ending the wrongful conduct and preventing future harm).
61. Draft Articles, supra note 60, art. 31.
62. Id.
63. Draft Articles, supra note 60, art. 34.
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Restitution, where possible and proportionate, takes priority over
other forms of reparation.' The purpose and scope of restitution are
detailed in Article 35, which states that restitution should reestablish
the situation that existed before the wrongful act, provided and to the
extent that restitution (a) is not materially impossible, and (b) does
not involve a burden disproportionate to the benefit derived from
restitution instead of compensation. 6s The ILC Articles help settle the
legal controversy of whether international law "supports the primacy
(or even the possibility) ... of restitutio in integrum," that is, the
restoration of the prior situation and the reparation of the
consequences of the violation.66
Where restitution or compensation cannot better an injury, Article
37 states that a responsible state must give satisfaction for the injury,
such as through an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of
regret, a formal apology, or other appropriate modality, including

64. See Factory at Chorz6w Case (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 48 (resolving that when ascertaining reparations that Poland must pay to an
injured German factory, the Permanent Court of International Justice must take
into account the value of property and the rights and interests of the factory to
restore itself to its state prior to the injury); see also Martini Case (Italy v. Venez.),
2 R.I.A.A. 975 (1930) (deciding that after suffering an injury, the contracting party
is entitled to not only an indemnity for the injury and a reimbursement of lost
investment, but also to a recompense of profits that the contracting party would
have reached relying on the contract). See generally Temple of Preah Vihear Case
(Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 37 (Judgment of June 15) (ruling that
Thailand, subsequent to violating the territorial sovereignty of Cambodia, must
withdraw its military and police forces and restore any items Thai authorities may
have taken from Cambodia's Temple of Preah Vihear).
65. Draft Articles, supra note 60, art. 35. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note
39, at 213 (contrasting differing definitions of restitution, including a return to the
situation that existed before the injury, and an establishment of the situation that
the victim would be in if the injury had never taken place).
66. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(1990) (explicating that restitutio in integrum falls into a legal category and a
material category). The legal category of restitutio in integrum concerns when a
tribunal orders the repeal or amendment of a measure of the defendant state's
legislature, executive, or judiciary of a defendant's state. Id. The material category
of restitutio in integrum contains an order for the culpable state to repair or return
property it seized illegitimately. Id.
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punishment of the perpetrators or a declaration of illegality.6 7 Such
satisfaction should be proportionate and not humiliating.6 8
The ILC Articles constitute a generic draft instrument for dealing
with the many different manifestations of international wrongs

attracting state responsibility. The U.N. Commission on Human
Rights' Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law ("Basic Principles on Reparation")
suggests a more extensive range of reparations specifically relevant
to human rights violations.69 While not legally binding, Basic
Principle 15 stipulates that reparation for rights violations must be
"adequate, effective and prompt," and proportional to the gravity of
67. See Draft Articles, supra note 60, art. 37.
68. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 212 (considering notions of fairness and
sensibility in excusing states from restitution when the burden of restitution on the
responsible state is acutely disproportional with the benefit that the victim would
receive from restitution).
69. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and
HumanitarianLaw, G.A. Res. 1999/33, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 11 (d), at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000) [hereinafter Basic Principles]
(enhancing the basic principles and guidelines of reparation as originally outlined
in U.N. Resolution 1998/43, including restitution and compensation for physical or
mental harm, lost earnings, and harm to reputation or dignity, for example). U.N.
Resolution 1989/13 of the U.N .Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities asked Theo Van Boven to study the right to
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of human rights violations.
Id. at 1-3. After Van Boven produced three successive drafts of basic principles
and guidelines, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights approved Van Boven's
final draft in Res 1996/35. Id. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1998/43 appointed Special Rapporteur M.C. Bassiouni to revise Van Boven's final
draft, taking into account the views of states and nongovernmental organizations.
Bassiouni's revision also considered the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Impunity by Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet and the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Id.; see also
Christian Tomuschat, Reparationfor Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations,
10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 157, 160 (2002) (maintaining that the international
community is following a trend of establishing mechanisms whereby victims may
seek reparations for violations of human rights); Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999
(creating an international criminal court to address and possess jurisdiction over
issues of human rights, such as crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
aggression),
of
crime
the
and
crimes,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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the violations and the harm suffered.7" Basic Principle 21 reiterates
that the primary forms of reparation include restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition.7 Basic Principle 22 enumerates specific examples of
restitution as including "restoration of liberty, legal rights, social
status, family life and citizenship; return to one's place of residence;
and restoration of employment and return of property. 7 2 Basic
Principle 25 details a range of measures that may provide satisfaction
and guarantees of non-repetition.7 3 Particular attention is given to
measures for preventing the recurrence of violations.74
Importantly, the Basic Principles on Reparation suggest rules
applicable to cases where a human rights violation is not attributable
to a state. Basic Principle 17 provides that a non-state party
responsible for a violation should provide reparation to the victim or
to the state if the state has already provided reparation. 5 When the
responsible non-state party is unable or unwilling to do so, Basic
Principle 18 encourages the state to provide reparation to victims
who have sustained bodily injury or impairment of physical or

70. See Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 9 (addressing concerns that the
Court may give victims reparations that are not appropriate for the injury, either
because the reparation is too meager for the severity of a crime or because the
reparation is too rewarding for the less substantial nature of a crime).
71. See id. at 10 (stating that the Court should provide reparations in
accordance with the state's domestic law and international obligations).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 11 (noting measures of satisfaction, including cessation;
verification and disclosure; the search for, identification of, and reburial of the
killed or disappeared; official declaration or judicial decision restoring the dignity,
reputation, and rights of the victim and connected persons; apology; sanctions
against those responsible; commemorations and tributes; human rights education
and training; and prevention of repetition).
74. See id. (including among the measures for preventing recurrence of the
violations civilian control of military and security forces; restricting the
jurisdiction of military tribunals; judicial independence; protecting legal, media,
human rights, and related professions; human rights training; codes of conduct and
ethical norms in public service; and conflict resolution and preventative
intervention).
75. See id. at 9 (outlining the duties of the party responsible for the violation
towards the state and the victim).

2004]

COMPENSATION FOR UNLA WFUL DEATH

539

mental health as a result of rights violations.76 States should provide
similar support to victims' families, particularly dependants of
persons who have died or become physically or mentally
incapacitated as a result of rights violations.77 Furthermore, Basic

Principle 19 urges states to enforce domestic judgments for
reparation against private individuals or entities responsible for
violations, in addition to enforcing valid foreign judgments against
such non-state perpetrators.78
B. INTER-AMERICAN COURT

The statutory basis for reparations decisions in the Inter-American
Court is Article 63(1) of the American Convention, which states:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall
also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation
be remedied and that
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom
79
fair compensation be paid to the injured party.

The wording of Article 63(1) confers a broad discretion on the
Inter-American Court to ensure the protection of rights and to
remedy the consequences of rights violations, including but not
limited to the payment of "fair" compensation." The language of the

American Convention is broader and more detailed than the

76. See Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 10. (suggesting that states should
establish national reparation funds exclusively for human rights victims and search
for additional funding when they need to augment their resources).
77. See id. (extending reparations past the individual to those who rely both
mentally and economically on the individual).
78. See id. (illustrating proper methods for expanding a state's ability to pay
reparations).
79. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63(1) (accepting that the Court
will espouse provisional measures in pending cases when it is necessary to prevent
irreversible damage to people and in cases of great exigency).
80. See Dinah Shelton, Reparations in the Inter-American System, in THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 151, 152 (David J. Harris &
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (stating that Article 63 gives the Inter-American
Court the power to ensure future respect for the right or freedom that was violated,
remedy the consequences of the violation, and compensate for the harm).
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comparable provision on reparations in the European Convention on
Human Rights, Article 50, which permits the ECHR to "afford just
satisfaction to the injured party."8 ' Indeed, commentators have
described the Court's judgments as representing "the most widereaching remedies afforded in international human rights law.'"82
The Court has repeatedly held that Article 63(1) of the American
Convention codifies a fundamental rule of customary law - that a
state incurs international responsibility for a wrongful act imputable
to it, with the resulting duty to make adequate reparation and
eliminate the consequences of the violation.83 Put another way, any

81. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 50, 213 U.N.T.S 222 (permitting just
satisfaction only if the ECHR finds that a High Contracting Party has taken a
resolution in conflict, wholly or partly, with obligations that the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms sets
out and if the domestic law of the High Contracting Party only allows it to make
limited reparations for its resolution), http://www.unhcr.md/article/conv.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004).
82. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 153 (explaining the apparent contradiction
between the language of Article 63(1) and the less than generous awards of
damages given to victims by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
83. See, e.g., "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 62 (2001) (remembering that Article
63(1) was a codification of a common law principle); Blake Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Jan. 22, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 33 (1999)
(describing Article 63(1) as a fundamental common law principle); Aloeboetoe et
al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 43 (1993) (noting that this principle has been recognized by other
tribunals, including the International Court of Justice); Garrido and Baigorria Case,
Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 40 (1998)
(correlating the right to reparation and the obligation found in Article 63(1));
Castillo Pdiez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 43, para. 50 (1998) (explaining that Article 63(1) is a fundamental
principle that is a responsibility of the States); Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory
Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 23
(1989) (describing the principle as a general concept of law); Caballero Delgado
and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 31, para. 15 (1998) (supporting the proposition that Article 63(1) is a
fundamental principle of international law by laying out the long history of case
law supporting this principle); Case Concerning the Factory Chorz6w, 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (stating that reparation is the "indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention"); Factory at Chorz6w, 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (explaining that any breach involves an obligation to
make reparations); Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
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violation of an international obligation that has produced damage
entails the obligation to make adequate reparation.84
The Court's judgments have broadly interpreted "reparation" as a
generic term covering the various ways a state can redress the
international responsibility it has incurred. These include restitutio in
integrum, payment of compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees of
non-repetition.85 The Court has noted that the mode of reparation will

Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 184 (Apr. 11) (outlining the role of an organization in
assuring that members fulfill obligations, including reparations); Interpretation of
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Second Phase, 1950 I.C.J.
221, at 228 (July 18) (mentioning that obligations to appoint representatives to
Treaty Commissions constitutes international responsibility).
84. See, e.g., Suarez Rosero Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1999,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44, para. 41 (1999) (explaining that reparations
include all the ways a state can remedy the international responsibility it has
incurred), http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/44.ing.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2004); Neira Alegria et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, paras. 36-37 (1996) (stating that international law
governs the reparation obligation); "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 77, para. 59 (remarking that the Court has reiterated this reparation
principle through consistent jurisprudence); Durand and Ugarte Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89, para. 24 (2001)
(listing numerous places that the Court has supported the principle that reparation
must be made when an international obligation is violated); Blake Case, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 33 (characterizing this principle to indicate that a
wrong imputable to a state creates a duty in that state to make reparation and end
any consequences of the wrong); Castillo Paez Case, Reparations, Judgment of
Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 84 (1998) (expressing the
belief that when a state violates the right to life, mere condemnatory judgment is
not sufficient and that pecuniary compensation should play a role); Aloeboetoe et
al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 48-49 (admitting that a state
cannot provide a remedy for all wrongs, but that those that that the state can
remedy, ought to be).
85. See, e.g., "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para.
60 (approving of full restitution when applicable, but requiring the court to pursue
measures to compensate when it is not); Durand and Ugarte Case, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89, para. 25 (defining full restitution as an attempt to reinstate a
prior situation); Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 31 (noting
that "reparations" is nothing more than a generic term which covers many
redressing actions a state can make); Castillo P6ez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 43, para. 48 (listing some of the ways that a state can make reparations,
including "assurances of guarantees that the violations will not be repeated");
Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 24 (including
emotional harm as an item that a state must address by reparations); Aloeboetoe et
al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 49 (recognizing that the law can
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vary according to the material and moral harm caused. The Court has
further accepted that international law governs the obligation to
make reparation in all its aspects: scope, nature, forms, and
determination of beneficiaries-none of which the respondent state
may alter by invoking its domestic law.86 The Court has followed the
international law principle that a state cannot plead its federal
structure or its domestic law to avoid complying with an
international obligation. 7 Reparations are not meant to enrich or
impoverish victims or their heirs88 and must be proportionate to the
rights violated. 9
demand reparations of only immediate effects of unlawful acts); Garrido and
Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39,
para. 41 (1998) (stating that reparation can include nullification of administrative
measures).
86. See, e.g., "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para.
61 (denying a respondent-state the right to modify or fail to comply with
international obligations by invoking domestic law); Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 32 (observing that the inability of a state to invoke
domestic law to overcome international obligation has been universally accepted);
Garrido and Baigorria Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 42
(implying that this principle has now become more entrenched through repetition
in case law); Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 44
(noting that a respondent state is not able to suspend a judgment with its domestic
law); Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 28 (noting that
international reparations must function independently of state law); Advisory
Opinion No. 17, Greco-Bulgarian "Communities," 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at
32-35 (applying the idea that international law takes precedence over municipal
law when dealing with relations between states who are treaty parties); Free Zones
of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 12
(explaining that despite this principle the court can not engage in modifications of
regulations pertaining to national jurisdictions); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167 (noting one
limitation of application of international doctrine in imposition of tax assessment
in national zones); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish
Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No 44, at 24 (relying on the principle to uphold provisions of a treaty
between States).
87. See Garridoand BaigorriaCase, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para.
46 (encountering no difficulty in denying the right to plead federal structure to an
international obligation); see also "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 77, para 61 (specifying "scope, nature, forms and determination of the
beneficiaries" to fall under regulation by international law).
88. See "Street Children " Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 63
(noting that reparations should be dependent only on the damage caused); Blake
Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48,
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Moreover, the Court has noted that it cannot compel perpetrators
of unlawful acts to erase consequences that are too remote or
distant,9" although as one commentator points out, "the Court is
singularly unhelpful in providing guidance to determine what harm
will be deemed too remote from the act for the actor to bear
responsibility." 91 The Court has stated only very generally that states
must "make reparation for the immediate effects of unlawful acts,
but only to the degree legally recognized." 92
Procedurally, the Court may order reparations in a separate
proceeding following an earlier merits judgment establishing
violations under the American Convention. The Court's Rules of
Procedure state that where the Court has made no specific ruling on
reparations in a judgment on the merits, the Court shall set the time
and determine the procedure for the deferred decision on
reparations. 93 The compensation amount is commonly disputed
during the reparations phase, and the representatives of victims or
their next of kin have had standing to submit arguments and evidence
during the reparations phase since 1997. 9' If, however, the parties
reach their own agreement on the execution of the merits judgment,

para. 34 (1999) (evaluating the nature of reparations as dependent on the damage

done on "material and moral levels"); Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of
Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 43 (1998) (denying
"exemplary damages" when reparations are called for); Castillo Pcez Case, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 53 (stating that reparations are intended to

"wipe out the effects" of a violation).

89. See Castillo Pdez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 51

(asserting that the reparations made by a state "must" be proportionate to the
violations of the American Convention provisions).
90. See Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 48 (1993) (comparing the effects of a wrong to

the ever increasing ripple effect of a stone cast in a lake).
91. Shelton, supra note 80, at 161.
92. Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 49.

93. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 56(1) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]

(explaining that the Court has the power to determine the procedure when no
specific
ruling
has
been
made
on
reparations),
at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/rulel-97.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
94. See id. art. 23(1) (adding that if there are several representatives or next of
kin, the Court may appoint an intervener to file the pleadings).
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the Court must verify the fairness of the agreement and rule
accordingly in a reparations decision. 95 This may include verification
of whether the state guarantees just compensation to the victims'
next of kin and whether it also provides for redress for the various
consequences of the human rights violations.96
Court supervision of settlements has been somewhat troubling. In
the Maqueda case, the Court, in an agreement, released a victim
claiming unlawful imprisonment by Argentina, conditioned on
discontinuation of compensation. 97 Although the Court believed
securing the victim's freedom was paramount under the Convention,
it seemed too ready to dispense with the remedial objective of
reparation.

III. COMPENSATION AS REPARATION FOR
UNLAWFUL DEATH
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

As the International Court of Justice stated in the Gab ikovoNagymaros Project, "[i]t is a well-established rule of international
law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the
State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the
damage caused by it."98 Article 36(1) of the ILC Articles reiterates

95. See id. art. 57(1)-(2) (explaining that the Court may decide upon the
procedure to determine reparations, and that the Court has the right to verify the
fairness of any agreement).
96. See Durand and Ugarte Case, Reparations, Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89, para. 23 (2001) (defining the Court's function as one
of evaluation of whether consequences of violations are adequately redressed and
whether the reparations agreement complies with the American Convention).
97. See Maqueda Case, Judgment of Jan. 17, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995) (dismissing the case because through agreement, the parties restored
Maqueda's right to freedom, and the Court found that agreement valid),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/18-ing.html (last visited January 30,
2004); see also Shelton, supra note 80, at 169 (noting that the Court, after
acknowledging the violation of the right to freedom, reserved the power to reopen
the Maqueda case should the need arise).
98. See Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 55
(Sept. 25) (assuming a duty to mitigate where a wrongful act is found); see also
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the general rule that states responsible for internationally wrongful
acts must "compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as
such damage is not made good by restitution." 99 As the International
Law Commission ("ILC") notes, though entitlement to compensation
is uncontroversial and supported by much case law,100 restitution is
frequently unavailable or inadequate.'' Article 36(2) states that
compensation must cover "any financially assessable damage
including loss of profits insofar as it is established."'' 0 2 The concept
of "damage" here includes material or moral damage, but the phrase
"financially assessable" is intended to exclude the award of moral
damages to states, since satisfaction is considered the more

Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 27 (viewing the tribunal's
role as applicable to relations only between states).
99. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 218 (noting that restitution is frequently
unavailable or inadequate, and thus compensation's role is to "fill in any gaps" in
order to ensure full reparation).
100. See id. at 219 (noting that reparations are not intended to punish
responsible States); see also MV "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent v. Guinea),
1999 Int'l. Tribunal L. Sea, para. 170 (July 1) (adopting as established law the
principle that a wronged state is entitled to reparations); Papamichalopoulos v.
Greece, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1995) (holding that the breaching state
had an obligation to end the breach and make reparations); Tippetts, Abbett,
McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl.
Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1986) (stating that international law is supposed to provide
"full" value of property deprived); Factory at Chorz6w, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
9, at 21 (insisting that claims to include clause compromissoire can not be
excluded in an action giving rise to reparations); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v.
Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 203-205 (July 25) (explaining that jurisdiction to determine
remedies arises out of a properly raised dispute); Military & Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 142 (June 27) (noting that the parties' actions led
to express submission to the Court's jurisdiction to determine remedies).
101. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 218 (stating that restitution "may be
partially or entirely ruled out either on the basis of the exceptions expressed in
Article 35, or because the injured State prefers compensation or for other
reasons").
102. See id. (emphasizing that Article 36(2) develops the definition of
"damages," which includes any material or moral damages, by specifying that
compensation will include any financially assessable damage, such as loss of
profits).
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appropriate form of reparation to states for non-material injury. °3
04
Damage includes that suffered by the state itself or by its nationals. 1
Historically, compensation for personal injury or wrongful death
most commonly arose in the field of the diplomatic protection of
nationals or state officials, frequently through the mechanism of
mixed claims commissions. 0 5 Concerning the appropriateness of a
monetary remedy for unlawful death, Whiteman restates the truism
that "[n]o amount of money can, of course, atone for the death of a
person."'0 6 Indeed, as Shelton notes, it is important to ensure the use
of non-monetary reparations in addition to compensation "to avoid
giving states the impression that they can buy the right to violate the
rights of others."'0 7 Compensation for unlawful death is nonetheless
important. As Grotius wrote in 1625:
One who unjustly takes human life is ... bound to give to this whom the
dead man was accustomed to support from a sense of duty, as parents,
wife, and children, so much as that expectation of support was worth in
view of the age of the person killed. 10 8

International practice has long established a duty to compensate
those who had an expectation of support from the deceased,0 9
although in some cases close relatives have been compensated
notwithstanding an absence of evidence as to any actual contribution
the deceased made."0 As Whiteman notes, "[a] claim for death by
103. Id. at 218.
104. See id. at 220 (including all legal persons, as well as corporations, within
the definition of "nationals").
105. See id. at 224 (adding that damages were typically based on an evaluation
of the surviving heirs or successors).
106. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 705.
107. Shelton, supra note 33, at 206.
108. HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACiS, BOOK II 434 (Francis W. Kelsey
et. al. trans., Widley & Son 1964) (1646).

109. See T.

RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW

206-207 (Cambridge,

J. Bentham 1754) (discussing the obligations arising from injustices).
110. See the French Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of Heirs of Jules
Brun (1906) Ralston's Report 5, 29; Heirs of Jean Maninat, (Fr. v. Venez.) 10
R.I.A.A. 55, 56 (1903) (explaining that a greater amount of damages were awarded
to the next of kin because of the "unatoned indignity to France" by the injuries
received by a French national).
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wrongful act is made not for the benefit of the estate.. but for the
benefit of the surviving dependents."'I
In the Lusitania cases, the U.S.-Germany Mixed Claims
Commission set out the types of losses that are generally
compensable in international law:
[T]he amounts (a) which the decedent, had he not been killed, would
probably have contributed to the claimant, add thereto (b) the pecuniary
value to such claimant of the deceased's personal services in claimant's
care, education, or supervision, and also add (c) reasonable compensation
for such mental suffering or shock, if any, caused by the violent severing
of family ties, as claimant may actually have sustained by reason of such
death. The sum of these estimates reduced to its present cash value, will
generally represent the loss sustained by claimant. 112

The losses in (a) and (b) above often are referred to as "material
damage" or "pecuniary damage" and commonly include loss of
earning and earning capacity as well as medical and other expenses.
Quantification of material damages requires an estimate of the
deceased's probable life expectancy and adjustments according to a
variety of individualized factors.' II
The losses in (c) above often are known as "moral damage,"
including mental suffering, injury to feelings, humiliation, shame,
degradation, loss of social position or injury to credit and reputation,
and affront to sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the person,
home, or private life." 4 It can also be very difficult to quantify moral
11. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 640 (commenting that the claimant state
has no duty to present an offer to the claimant if the claimant state feels it is a
reasonable offer); LUsITANIA CLAIMS, supra note 27, 208-09 (stating that the right
to compensation for moral damages does not vest in the claimant through the
decedent because the decedent never had such a right).
112. See LUSITANIA CLAIMS, supra note 27, at 196 (holding that in death cases,
the right of action is for the loss sustained by the claimants, not by the estate).
113. See id. (commenting further that the factors used to calculate damages is
not exclusive and one may consider other factors); see also WHITEMAN, supra note
11, at 682-83 (listing factors used to calculate an indemnity award including the
deceased's state of health, vocational risks, earnings, prospects of continued
employment and promotion, character, contribution to claimants and probability of
continuing contribution, and the number, age, and changing needs of dependents).
114. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 223 (citing international law cases where
the courts granted compensation for nonmaterial damages); see also Affaire
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damages." 5 In the case of Beatrice Di Caro, the Venezuelan
Arbitrations of 1903 awarded 50,000 bolivars, deeming such an
award as "just" for moral damage, despite the acknowledgement that
"[f]or all this no human standard of measurement exists, since
affection, devotion and companionship may not be translated into
any certain or ascertainable number of bolivars or pounds
sterling."' 16
Gray argues that in international arbitral practice there are few
instances of compensation for pain, suffering, and emotional distress,
with the exception of the Janes case. 117 One reason suggested is that
although moral damages are commonly awarded in Western legal8
systems, communist legal systems reject such a head of damage."
Gray was, however, writing in 1990, and the subsequent global
decline of communism has arguably freed international law from this
ideological dispute." 9 Subsequent developments firmly support the
availability of moral damages for human rights violations. 120 In
addition to the generic position in the ILC Articles addressing rights
Chevreau (Fr. v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1113, 1114 (1923) (examining damages in the
case of internment); Di Caro Case (Italy v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 597, 597 (1903)
(holding that when the Venezuelan government killed a woman's husband, she was
entitled not only to her late husband's future earnings but also to compensation for
the loss of his personal companionship); Heirs of Jean Maninat, 10 R.I.A.A. at 8182 (noting that the victim's next of kin were entitled to damages because of the
extreme indignity Venezuela put upon France by treating a French citizen in an
outrageous, illegal manner).
115. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 223 (commenting that the loss of loved
ones, pain, and intrusion are difficult violations to quantify monetarily).
116. See JACKSON H. RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903 770
(1904) (commenting that the distressing nature of Di Caro's death was also a factor
in determining an award for compensation).
117. See GRAY, supra note 66, at 34 (emphasizing that an award for damage to
reputation is considered exceptional in international arbitration practice); see, e.g.,
Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 82 (1926) (holding that compensation
would not be given for indignity, grief, and other wrongs).
118. See id. (noting that although many Western legal systems allow for
compensation based on an act done on the state's behalf, communism rejects the
principle).
119. See id. (reflecting on the uncertain nature of an award for moral damages in
international arbitrage).
120. See Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 5 (noting the various recent U.N.
resolutions that strengthen the rights of victims of moral damages).
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violations, the Basic Principles on Reparation reinforce the
appropriateness of moral damages. 21 Basic Principle 23(1) suggests
compensation for any economically assessable damage resulting
from human rights violations, including:
(a) Physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and
emotional distress;
(b) Lost opportunities, including education;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of
earning potential;
(d) Harm to reputation or dignity; and
and
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines
22
medical services, and psychological and social services.1
Basic Principle 23(2) adds that rehabilitation should include
medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services. 23
Moral damages are particularly suitable in cases involving serious
human rights violations, given that these violations dangerously
24
impair human dignity.
B. INTER-AMERICAN COURT
The Court has stated that there may be cases in which restitutio in
integrum is impossible, insufficient, and inadequate. 2 5 It has
considered this to be particularly so in cases where a state has

121. See id. at 6 (mandating that the international community protect the
physical and psychological safety of victims).
122. See id. at 10 (resolving that in addition to compensation, victims should
also be entitled to other forms of reparation, including restitution, rehabilitation,
and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition).
123. See id. (stating that compensation should include the cost of any
professional services a victim may need, including: legal, medical, psychological,
or social services).
124. See id. (noting that for harm to be subject to compensation, it must be both
economically assessable and the result of a violation of international human rights
or humanitarian law).
125. See Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
48 (stating that when restitution is impossible, other means of compensation must
be considered).
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violated an individual's right to life. 26 As the Court stated in the
seminal case of Vehlsquez Rodriguez (1988):
Clearly, in the instant case, the Court cannot order that the victim be
guaranteed the enjoyment of the right or liberty violated. The Court,
breach of the rights be
however, can rule that the consequences of the 127
remedied and rule that just compensation be paid.

Compensation in death cases will be the primary remedy for
damages suffered by the injured party, and includes, as the Court has
held previously, both material damages (including loss of earnings
128.
and indirect damages such as expenses) and moral damages.
126. See generally, e.g., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14,
1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 3 (1996) (detailing the killing of
fourteen fisherman by Venezuelan police officers); Garrido and Baigorria Case,
Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 3-5 (1998)
(describing the events surrounding the arrest and subsequent disappearance of two
men in Argentina); Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10,
1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 3-7 (1993) (recounting an attack
by Surinam soldiers on more than twenty unarmed Maroons that resulted in the
death of at least six Maroons); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 2 (1998)
(recounting the disappearance and possible execution of two Columbians); Castillo
Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 43, para. 2 (1998) (stating that the Peru had violated the rights of the late Paez
and his next of kin was entitled to compensation); Neira Alegria et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para.
5 (1996) (deciding that Peru violated the right of habeas corpus to the detriment of
three of its citizens and that Peru should compensate their survivors).
127. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 189 (1988) (indicating that a state guilty of human rights
violations must be accountable).
128. See Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 37 (1989 (holding that the
involuntary disappearance of Sr. Cruz entitles his family to compensation for
moral damages); Garridoand BaigorriaCase, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39,
paras. 41, 47 (explaining that "reparation" is a generic term that covers how a state
may make amends for the international responsibility it has incurred); Caballero
Delgado and Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 17 (listing
other cases where the Court has used alternative forms of reparations); El Amparo
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, 16 (stating that the Court will provide
compensation for both material and moral damages); Aloeboetoe et al. Case, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 47-50 (stating that the rule of integrum
instituto refers to only one way that the effect of an international wrongful act may
be redressed).
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Compensation for violation of the right to life may be available in
cases of forced disappearances even where no corpse was
discovered. In Vel6squez Rodriguez (1989) the Court stated:
The practice of disappearances often involves secret execution without
trial, followed by concealment of the body to eliminate any material

evidence of the crime and to ensure the impunity of those responsible.
This is a flagrant29violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4 of
the Convention. 1

In such cases, the Court has flexibly determined the standard of
proof necessary to support its judgments, since neither the American
Convention, the Statute of the Court, nor its Rules of Procedure
regulate the standard of proof. 130 The Court has emphasized that
"international jurisprudence has recognized the power of the courts
to weigh the evidence freely" and "always avoided a rigid rule
regarding the amount of proof necessary.' ' 3 1 Consequently, the Court
has viewed circumstantial or presumptive evidence as especially
important in testing allegations of disappearances, "because this type
of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress any
information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the
victim."'"
1. MaterialDamages
To determine material damages, the Court generally ascertains
who has sustained a loss of income owing to the victim's death or
disappearance.' 33 It also may ascertain who the injured parties are,
and what family, labor, business, farm, industrial, or other activity

129. Velasquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 157.
130. See id. para. 127 (determining the standards of proof applied in the case
based on various international law standards).
131.
132.
133.
H.R.

Id.
Id. para. 131.
See Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
(Ser. C) No. 39, para. 58 (1998) (explaining that it is necessary, in

determining damages suffered, to identify who or what entity sustained the loss of
the victim's income).
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suffered a loss due to the victim's death. 34 For loss of wages, the
Court calculates compensation on the basis of the victim's age at the
time of death, the years remaining before he or she would have
reached the age of normal national life expectancy, and actual
incomes, calculated on the basis of the victim's actual wage.135 For
survivors, the calculation includes the time during which they
36
remained unemployed. 1
In default of precise income information, the calculation may
depend on the minimum monthly wage in effect in the country, 137 or
in a specific part of the country, such as the rural or non-agricultural
sectors. The Court has used as a base salary an amount not less than
the cost of the basic food basket, which was higher than the

134. See id. (stating that the first order of business is determining the source that
suffered due to the victim's death).
135. See El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28 (1996) (granting an indemnity based on the age
of the victim's dependents); Castillo Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27,
1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 75 (1998) (noting that anticipated
bonuses are also included in material damages); Neira Alegria et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para.
49 (1996) (stating that when the Court cannot determine an actual wage, it may
substitute the applicable minimum); see also Suarez Rosero Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Jan. 20, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44, para. 58 (1999)
(holding that the time a victim remained unemployed can be taken in to account
when determining material damages).
136. See El Amparo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28 (stating
that damages for survivors is based in part on the time during which they remained
unemployed as well as their age at the time of death); Castillo Pez Case, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 75 (emphasizing that personal expenses are
deducted from a victim's gross income); Suarez Rosero Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 44, para. 59 (stating that when the victim is alive the damages may be
based on his actual income).
137. See Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 88-89 (1993) (detailing the process the Court
uses to adjust potential earnings for inflation); Neira Alegria et al. Case, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 49 (describing the alternative method for
calculation as the minimum monthly wage in effect in the country). But see "Street
Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 77, para. 79 (2001) (arguing that the minimum wage cannot be applied if
the victims do not hold continuous employment).
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minimum rural wage. 3 1 One should calculate compensation on the
basis of a definite injury that is sufficiently substantiated to find that
the injury likely occurred, so evidence must show whether an
improvement in the victim's future income was a "probable
certainty." '39 The compensation may include bonuses in salary due. 40
In the Bmaca Velcsquez case, the Court awarded damages to the
4
family of a deceased guerilla leader who was not earning wages.11
The Commission argued that the deceased would have earned a
salary after the end of the civil war in Guatemala by working in a
leadership position in civil society.'42 Compensation consisted of an
by three other guerilla
averaging of the salaries earned after the war
43
1
leader.
community
Mayan
one
and
leaders
Once the loss of income calculation is made, the Court normally
deducts twenty-five percent for personal expenses.'" The Court then
138. See, e.g., El Amparo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28
(discussing how the Court used a base salary higher than the minimum rural wage
that was an amount not less than the cost of a basic food basket).
139. See Castillo Pdez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 74
(holding that a probable certainty of an increase in the victim's income potential
was not sufficient to adjust the basis of the victim's future earnings).
140. See Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug.
27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 42 (1998) (accepting the
Commission's recommendation that the Court should include unemployment
benefits equaling two additional monthly salaries per year in the calculation of lost
earnings).
141. See Megan Hagler & Francisco Rivera, Bdmaca Veldsquez v. Guatemala:
An Expansion of the Inter-American System's Jurisprudence on Reparations, 9
HUM. RTs. BRIEF 2, 3 (Spring 2002) (asking the Court to award damages to the
victim's family in order to acknowledge the violations and to sanction the state).
142. See id. (reasoning that since the Court had previously awarded
compensation in this manner, the Court ought to award damages based on the
salary the victim would have earned after the end of the civil war).
143. See id. (clarifying the Court's goal to award damages that would place the
victim's family in the financial position they would have been in had the violation
against Bimaca not occurred).
144. See, e.g., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28 (1996) (deducting twenty-five percent of
the calculated base amount of compensation for personal expenses); Castillo Piez
Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43,
para. 75 (1998) (explaining how the Court calculated lost earnings by using the
minimum monthly wage multiplied by forty-nine years, the victim's remaining life
expectancy, while also subtracting twenty-five percent for personal expenses);
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adds to this amount the interest accruing from the date of the events
up to the date of judgment.'45 The Court may appoint an actuary to
assist in calculations. 146 In one case, the Court calculated the amount
that, invested at a nominal interest rate, would have a monthly yield
equivalent to the amount of the income the victims would have
received during their probable lifetime. 47 Material damage was thus
the "present value of an income from their monthly earnings for the
rest of their probable lifetime and is ...less than the simple sum of
' 48
their earnings."'
The Court awards no compensatory material damages when the
death or disappearance of a victim did not cause his or her family or
dependants any economic damage, deprive him or her of economic
support, or when there is no evidence that the victim had ever
provided such support. 149 This approach seems more logical than the
murkier position in general international law, since Gray writes that
in some cases awards have been given to dependants even where
there is no evidence that the deceased supported or would support the
claimant. 50 Further, Gray notes that damages to relatives also have
Neira Alegria et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 50 (1996) (noting that in performing the calculations,
the Court deducted twenty-five percent for personal expenses).
145. See, e.g., El Amparo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28
(indicating that after deducting the twenty-five percent for personal expenses, the
Court added the interest accruing from the date of the events to the present to the
calculation); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug.
27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 40 (1998) (stating that interest
must be added from the date of the victim's death).
146. See ElAmparo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28 (alluding
to the actuary's calculations that the Court used in determining the monetary
amounts to go to the victims' families).
147. See CaballeroDelgado and Santana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31,
para. 39 (explaining that the Court would deduct personal expenses that the victims
would have spent during their lifetimes).
148. Neira Alegria et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 46.
149. See Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, paras. 60-61 (1998) (relating that although the victim's
relatives contended that the victim was a bricklayer, they had no evidence of his
profession, nor was there any proof that any of his siblings or his natural children
lived with him or financially depended on him).
150. See GRAY, supra note 66, at 37 (noting that tribunals often give no reason
for the damages that they award).
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been awarded in "many cases" where the relatives have not suffered
any pecuniary loss.' 5 '
The Court also has compensated the "nuclear family's patrimonial
damages" where the disappearance of a victim was detrimental to the
family group's employment or business activities, and redress is
based on the principles of equity. 5 2 The Court recognizes the
difficulty of determining such damages, since it is impossible to
establish a causal nexus between the act and consequences alleged to
business
have followed (e.g., the bankruptcy of the victim's family
153
value).
market
than
less
at
or the sale of the family home
2. Moral Damages
The Court notes that numerous cases in other international
tribunals have determined that a judgment of condemnation
constitutes adequate reparation per se for moral damages. 54 The
Court has relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ECHR in this
respect.1 55 Yet if the circumstances of the case are serious enough,
the Inter-American Court will regard condemnation as insufficient,

151. Id. at38.
152. See Castillo Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 75 (1998) (recognizing the difficulty of determining
how integral one member may be to a small, family-run enterprise).
153. See id. (noting that the death of an essential family member may have more
severe economic repercussions than can be immediately determined).
154. See, e.g., "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 88 (2001) (agreeing that a judgment of
condemnation is per se a form of compensation, yet that in fairness the Court must
order a payment of compensation in this case); Castillo Pdez Case, (Ser. C) No.
43, para. 84 (citing to several cases from the ECHR that have also decided that a
judgment of condemnation constitutes per se reparation for moral damages); Blake
Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48,
para. 55 (1999) (recognizing that a judgment of condemnation is reparation for
moral damages but deciding that in this case, compensation is necessary as well);
Neira Alegria et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 56 (1996) (explaining that condemnation may serve as
a form of reparation and moral satisfaction).
155. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 166 (highlighting that in Aloeboetoe, the
Court rejected its own precedent and referenced the practice of the ECHR in
deciding moral damages).
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and require compensation for moral damages.'56 The Court has thus
found that indemnity may be awarded under international law for
emotional harm or psychological suffering (i.e. "moral damages,"
57
resulting from human rights violations).1
The nature of the suffering is central to the assessment of
compensation for moral damages. The Court has held that it is
characteristic of human nature that anybody subjected to the
aggression and abuse involved in grave cases will experience moral
suffering or damage; therefore, once responsibility is established or
admitted, no evidence of moral suffering is required.'58 Grave cases
may include killings, forced disappearances, incommunicado
detention and torture, and being forced to dig one's own grave,
among others. 5 9 Expert psychological evidence also may explain the

156. See "Street Children," Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 88
(detailing when non-pecuniary damage may be compensated); Neira Alegria et al.
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 56 (opining on when moral
satisfaction is fair compensation).
157. See, e.g., Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July
21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 49 (1989) (noting that
international law provides for such indemnification).
158. See, e.g., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 91-93 (1993) (awarding the families of
men kidnapped and killed by soldiers moral damages of approximately US
$29,000, and awarding the family of a victim who survived a few days before
dying a slightly higher amount because of the suffering the deceased endured);
Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 39. paras. 62-65 (1998) (compensating the families of kidnapping victims
with awards ranging from US $6,000 to US $75,000, depending on the closeness
of the family member's relationship to the victim); see also Castillo Pdez Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43,
paras. 86, 87-90 (1998) (holding that the sister and parents of a kidnapping victim
were entitled to a total of US $160,000 in moral damages as a result of the victim's
suffering, the anguish and uncertainty resulting from his disappearance, and the
lack of information regarding his whereabouts); Neira Alegria et al. Case, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, paras. 16, 57-58 (determining that, because of the
brutal nature of the victims' deaths, their families were each entitled to US $20,000
in moral damages).
159. See, e.g., Suarez Rosero Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1999,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44, paras. 63, 65, 67 (1999) (awarding damages
totaling US $50,000 to the family of a prisoner who was held incommunicado and
suffered physical and mental abuses); Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 15, para. 51 (considering in its assessment of damages the facts that
the victims were beaten, knew they were going to die, and dug their own graves).
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extent of suffering. 60 Very recently, the Court held that lesser forms
of suffering, such as "the impairment of values that are highly6 1
significant" to the victims, may be compensable as moral damages.'
Moral damages also have been awarded to the spouse of a deceased
where the responsible government was untruthful, acted in bad faith
in judicial proceedings, and sought to damage the petitioner's
62
reputation.
Partners, parents, children, siblings, and dependents may suffer
moral damages. 63 In contrast to successors, dependants must plead
and prove moral damages, 64 with the exception of parents who are
not successors. 65 Moral damages may be nominal where siblings can
prove no affective relationship with the victim, such as where the
sibling had minimal contact or interest in the victim during the
victim's life. 66 However, even children who never knew a victim
parent are entitled to compensation for the suffering the victim

160. See, e.g., "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 56 (2001) (utilizing the testimony of a
clinical psychologist and two children's rights experts in assessing the trauma and
psychological harm the victims suffered).
161. Id. para. 84.
162. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 3-4 (stating that the Court in the
Bfmaca case ordered Guatemala to pay damages for the moral suffering of
Veldsquez's family resulting from the government's ongoing bad faith acts).
163. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of November 27, 1998,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42, paras. 140-143 (1998) (awarding moral
and
siblings),
parents,
children,
victim's
the
to
damages
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/42-ing.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
164. See Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 75 (1993) (holding that the victims'
dependants must prove moral damages when they seek them).
165. See id. paras. 76-77 (explaining that victims' parents can be presumed to
have suffered morally as a result of the death of their offspring, and it is therefore
only appropriate for victims' parents to participate in the distribution of moral
damage compensation even if they have not been declared successors). This
exception is justified based on the fact that the cruel death of their children will
inevitably cause parents to suffer morally. Id.
166. See Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 64 (1998) (limiting compensation for the siblings of
disappeared persons because of a lack of "credible or convincing evidence" that
proved an "affective relationship" such that the disappearances would have caused
"grievous suffering").
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sustained in life as heirs.'6 7 The proximity of the relationship is
68
relevant to the determination of compensation.
The Court has noted that it cannot assess suffering and distress in
financial terms. 169 Indemnification must be based upon the principles
of equity, fairness, and the special circumstances of each case. 70 The
Court will award compensation on the basis of a prudent assessment
of moral damages, rather than according to an absolute rule or
precise evaluation. 7 ' Prudence and equity do not mean to infer that
the Court has absolute discretion in setting the amounts of
compensation; rather, the Court must strictly adhere to the methods
ordinarily used in the case law to calculate appropriate

167. See id. para. 65 (providing compensation for the children of a disappeared
parent regardless of the fact that they had no relations with each other).
168. See Castillo Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 89 (1998) (considering, for the purposes of
measuring the psychological consequences of the victim's sister's loss, the fact that
the sister lived with the victim prior to the disappearance, and that the victim was
her only sibling).
169. See "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, paras. 84-86 (2001) (identifying that there are
certain damages that fall outside the traditional scope of calculated damages, and
thus the Court must consider non-pecuniary damages as well). For example, the
Court in "Street Children" focused on suffering due to the State's negligence in
making adequate efforts to locate, deliver, and bury persons, and to communicate
with affected families. Id.
170. Cf Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, paras. 27-28 (1988) (discussing other "international
instruments" that defend indemnification, including the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the ECHR); see also Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages,
Judgment of July 21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, paras. 24-25 (1989)
(explaining that full restitution of an international violation requires
indemnification, which it defines to include both patrimonial and non-patrimonial
damages); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug.
27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 3, paras. 48-51 (1998) (highlighting that
reparations for indemnification are fact specific and not based on "rigid criteria"
when mitigating the Commissions' request for damages).
171. See Castillo Pfiez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, paras. 83-86
(rejecting the ECHR's per se rule of law regarding reparations for moral damages,
and applying a case by case approach); see also El Amparo Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, paras. 34-35
(1996) (underscoring that case law may establish precedent, but because
calculating reparations is fact specific, that precedent cannot be invoked as
universally accepted).
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compensation. 72 Precedent is not an absolute criterion, as one must
examine each case individually. " 3
Compensation may take the form of a monetary payment or the
assignment of goods and services. 17 4 As an alternative to monetary
reparation for moral damages, the Court recently held that moral
damages may be compensated by:
the execution of acts or works of a public nature or repercussion, which
have effects such as recovering the memory of the victims, reestablishing
their reputation, consoling their next of kin or transmitting a message of
and
official condemnation of the human rights violations in question
75
1
again.
happen
not
do
they
that
ensure
to
efforts
the
to
commitment

Other factors relevant to the calculation of the amount of
compensation may include whether the state acknowledged the facts
and accepted responsibility, 176 whether the reprehensible conduct of

172. See Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 87 (1993) (deferring to precedent government
the calculation of damage).
173. See Neira Alegria et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, paras. 55-58 (1996) (establishing that
precedent with regard to moral damages cannot be binding and that all "special
circumstances" of the case must be taken into account); see also Blake Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para.
54 (1999) (citing Neira Alegria in its calculation of moral damages to refute the
State's claim that damages are not appropriate based on precedent); Castillo Pdez
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 83 (relying on Neira Alegria to
consider the unique circumstances of the case when calculating damages); El
Amparo Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 34 (discussing case law in
which the State "acknowledged the facts and accepted responsibility" versus when
it did not and highlighting how fact-specific damage awards underscore the
importance of maintaining flexibility in calculating reparations).
174. See "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 84 (2001) (explaining one alternative to
compensate non-pecuniary damages that would require the Court to determine a
value by prudently applying both "judicial discretion and the principle of equity").
175. Id.
176. See El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, paras. 32-34 (1996) (citing that both the IACHR and the
ECHR give credence to the concept that any time either court recognizes that a
right has been violated, reparations for damages suffered should be provided,
particularly where the "State has unilaterally recognized its responsibility").
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public officials aggravated the suffering,' 77 or whether the state failed
to investigate properly.'78 Where minors are the victims of human
rights violations, the award of moral damages may be higher in order
to recognize that the victims were deprived of the special measures
of protection the state owes to children. 7 9
3. Expenses and Costs

The Court has stated that expenses connected with a human rights
violation fall within the definition of damages but the Court can only
award such damages if the plaintiff pleads and proves such
expenses. 80 Nonetheless, in some cases, the Court has awarded
compensation for expenses incurred by families of deceased victims
and to survivors of human rights violations in their representations to
national authorities-even though the families failed to present any

177. See Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 62 (1998) (explaining that the fact that Province public
servants were responsible for the disappearance presumptively caused "grave
suffering" to the mother and eliminated the need for any other evidence to prove
damages).
178. See Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 56 (holding that
authorities' failures to investigate disappearances "generate suffering and anguish,
in addition to a sense of insecurity, frustration and impotence"); see also
Velsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 4, paras. 32-34 (1988) (suggesting that compensation could include causing
the Government to continue to investigate a disappeared person so long as his fate
is unknown); Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, paras. 30-34 (1989) (identifying the
ability of the Court to enforce the Government's duty to investigate the fate of an
unknown person as a part of the victim's compensation).
179. See "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, paras. 8991 (noting that the "destruction of the life plan" of five abandoned street children
created "grave circumstances" that weighed heavily in the calculation of damages).
180. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July
21, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 42 (1989) (denying a damage
award for costs incurred while investigating the disappeared, because no costs
were "pleaded or proven opportunely" at trial and there was no pleading
supporting the request); see also Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 8, para. 40 (noting that while damages for expenses related to investigation are
awarded as part of fair compensation, the lack of proof of such costs incurred
prevent compensation in the case at hand).
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proof of expenses-on the basis of equity or fairness. 8'

In its

assessment, the Court stated that it must:
assess prudently the scope of the costs and expenses, bearing in mind the
particular circumstances of the case, the nature of the international
jurisdiction for the protection of human rights and the characteristics of
the respective proceeding, which are unique
and differ from those of other
82
national or international proceedings.1

The Court may award compensation for reasonable extrajudicial
expenses incurred in ascertaining the whereabouts of disappeared or

deceased persons, such as when the government covers up what
occurred and the authorities fail to investigate the facts.' 83 Economic
loss has been further expanded to include the forfeiture of income by

one spouse who interrupted his or her career to search for a
184
disappeared spouse.

Critics of the Commission have voiced criticism of the
Commission in the past for its failure to seek compensation for loss
of personal services and the value of the deceased to the family,
resulting in "substantially less being claimed in material damages

181. See El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 21 (1996) (granting an indemnity award to the
families of both deceased victims and survivors to compensate the expenses of
their "representations to national authorities"); see also Neira Alegria et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29,
paras. 39-42 (1996) (awarding compensation to families for time and travel
expended in the process of seeking legal recourse through domestic courts).
182. "Street Children" Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 107; see
also Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 39, paras. 79-80 (1998).
183. See Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, paras. 48-49 (awarding
damages for "expenses in the form of airline tickets, lodging, meals, payments for
telephone calls"); see also Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept.
10, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 79 (1993) (awarding damages
to the deceased's next of kin for expenses incurred as a result of gathering
information after the killings, searching for the bodies, and seeking recourse with
authorities).
184. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 3 (outlining the various types of
material damages to which both the disappeared and his family are entitled
regarding economic loss).
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' The Court's case law now establishes
than was actually suffered."185
that expenses for transport, domestic assistance, and physical and
psychological medical expenses are compensable.1 1 6 Medical
expenses may result from the disappearance of relatives, the
uncertainty as to their whereabouts, the suffering on learning of their
death, and the frustration and impotence in the face of the failed
investigations due to government cover-ups.187 Expenses addressing
the aggravation of existing medical conditions also are
recoverable.1 88 Compensation also has been awarded for damage to
the physical health of the spouse of a man who died as a result of
hunger strikes.18 9
The Court has dismissed claims for expenses such as groceries,
toiletries, clothes, and children's educational expenses on the basis
that an incarcerated victim would have had to pay for those expenses
were he or she not in prison. 190 Income forgone by a victim's relative

185. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 159-160 (explaining that the Commission
has based their calculations on "extremely conservative assumptions," excluding
personal services and the value the decedent has to the family). While there is no
clear reason why the Commission has taken this approach, one reason discussed
was that these factors might have been too subjective or difficult in application. Id.
186. See Suarez Rosero Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1999, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44, para. 60 (1999) (explaining that the victim and his
spouse incurred certain expenses only as a result of the imprisonment at issue).
With respect to medical expenses, the Court declared that the victim was entitled to
compensation for the physical and psychological mistreatment because evidence
verified that all treated ailments were the direct consequence of the imprisonment.
Id. With respect to transportation and domestic help, the Court declared that the
victim's spouse was entitled to compensation of these expenses incurred only as a
result of the absence of her husband. Id.
187. See Blake Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 48, para. 50 (1999) (determining that the brother of a
disappeared person was "one of the injured parties" and holding the State
accountable for all medical treatment he received as a result of the disappearance).
188. See "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 80 (2001) (awarding compensation payments
to families of the disappeared that include medicine and medical treatment for
existing conditions).
189. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 4 (noting that the Commission, in
B6maca Veldsquez, sought compensation for the loss of life due to hunger strikes).
190. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of November 27, 1998,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 131 (1998) (denying compensation for
any claim where a "causal nexus to the wrongful acts perpetrated against the
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under an employment contract due to time spent defending the victim
is also not compensable, since there is no causal nexus to the
wrongful act. 9' Though a judgment may order payment of expenses
relating to the relatives' representations to the authorities, expenses
incurred by other persons or organizations are not payable.192
Article 55(1) of the Court's Rules of Procedure may allow for
legal costs.' 93 The Court has indicated that the concept of costs
covers access to justice at both the national level and access to
international justice involving the Inter-American Commission and
the Court. 94 Prior to the enactment of the 1997 Rules, the Court had
awarded only legal costs associated with the pursuit of national
remedies for human rights violations while denying legal costs
within the Inter-American system. 95 The Court made this distinction
because it felt that party-states to the American Convention already
separately fund the Commission, which represents victims, and
because it dubiously appeared "to assume that rich non-governmental
196
organizations ("NGOs") can afford to represent clients."'

victim" and the damages sought is absent). The Court further denied damages for
alleged lost job contracts on this same basis. Id.
191. See id. (holding that the victim's wife was not entitled to compensation for
giving up employment contracts in order to have time to defend her husband
because there was no proof to support her claims and no clear causal relationship).
192. See Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug.
27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 47 (1998) (stating that nonrelative representations are not reimbursable expenses because the judgment on the
merits only recognized compensation for relatives' representation).
193. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 93, art. 55(1) (relating that judgments
will contain decisions relating to costs).
194. See "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, paras. 108-09 (2001) (noting that cost includes the
cost to access justice before the Commission and the Court on the international
level, and then reimbursing the victims' next of kin based on the costs of pursuing
justice); see also Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 81 (1998) (asserting that when considering the
cost amount, the Court may include "legal assistance," and it begins with domestic
court proceedings, following through the Commission and Court proceedings,
while excepting legal assistance at those levels that is free).
195. See Shelton, supra note 50, at 204 (indicating that the Court had never
reimbursed attorney's fees and costs for a petition before the Court).
196. Id. at 205.
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4. Damage to a "Life Plan"
In the Loayza Tamayo case, the Court considered the notion of
damages to a victim's "life plan," or "proyecto de vida," viewing this
as a category of damages separate from special damages, loss of
earnings, and indirect or consequential damages.' 97 Life plan
damages deal "with the full self-actualization of the person
concerned and takes account of her calling in life, her particular
circumstances, her potentialities, and her ambitions, thus permitting
her to set for herself, in a reasonable manner, specific goals, and to
attain those goals."' 98 Life plan is a manifestation of freedom, since
an individual is not truly free if he does not have options to pursue in
life. 199 The Court found that such options have an important

existential value, the elimination or curtailment of which objectively
abridges freedom and constitutes the loss of a valuable asset, which
the Court cannot disregard. °0
The Court further held that a claim for loss of life options due to
wrongful acts is entirely admissible "to satisfy the exigencies of
justice: complete redress of the wrongful injury ...it more closely

approximates the ideal of restitutio in integrum.' ' 0 ' It may be
particularly relevant where victims are minors.20 2 In Loayza Tamayo,
the Commission argued for compensation for a surviving victim of
unlawful detention and torture, causing serious physical and
psychological effects, which prevented the victim from resuming

197. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, InterAm Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 147 (1998) (comparing the notion of a victim's
"life plan" to other various types of damages).

198. Id.
199. See id. para. 148 (conveying the idea that the options an individual has as to
how he chooses to lead his life and how to achieve his goals are the manifestations
and guarantees of his freedom).
200. See id. (holding that the Court must take into account the loss of an
individual's options for carrying his life to its natural conclusion as a valuable

loss).
201. Id. para. 151.
202. See "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 89 (2001) (remarking that if a victim is a
minor it is important to consider the failure of the state to provide special measures
of protection when evaluating claims for damages).
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study and developing her professional and personal goals. 2°3 Despite
recognizing the possibility of grave damage to a life plan caused by
violations of human rights, the Court stated in Loayza Tamayo that
"neither case law nor doctrine has evolved to the point where
acknowledgment of damage to a life plan can be translated into
economic terms. Hence, the Court is refraining from quantifying
it. ''2°4 It noted, however, that the "victim's recourse to international
tribunals and issuance of the corresponding judgment constitute
some measure of satisfaction. 2 5
The Commission and a victim's representative, the Centre for
Justice and International Law ("CEJIL"), pleaded damage to a life
plan in the Bcmaca Velkisquez case.20 6 The Commission argued that
the State's killing of the victim violated the victim's right to live his
life plan, in addition to arguing for material and moral damages.20 7
There was evidence that the victim, a guerilla leader, planned to
provide political leadership in civil society following peace accords
in Guatemala.2 8 CEJIL argued that the deceased's wife was entitled
to compensation for damage to her life plan, on the basis that the
unlawful death of her husband had interfered with her plan to raise a

203. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 4 (noting that the "life plan"
argument could be valid, but not in this particular case, as the Court refused to
award damages because it appeared impossible to put monetary value on a victim's
loss of a life plan).
204. Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 153 (1998).
205. Id.
206. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 4 (explaining that although the
Commission requested that the Court consider Bdmaca's loss of his life plan, in
deciding the amount to award in compensation, the Court made no such award).
207. See Banaca VelAsquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91, paras. 2, 70 (2002) (arguing that the Court
should recognize that Bmaca lost possibilities in "self-realization" and "life
options" as a result of the State's violations against him, including the rights to life
and personal liberty).
208. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 4 (describing the steps Bdmaca
took to prepare himself for a position in civil society, including learning to read
and write and developing leadership skills).

566

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[19:523

family and live with her husband. 209 The Court rejected these
claims.210
So far, the Court has not compensated victims of forced
disappearances for the destruction of their life plan or that of their
relatives or dependants.211 In Cantoral Benavides, however, the
Court compensated a victim of unlawful detention and torture for
damage to his life plan by requiring the responsible state, Peru, to
fund a scholarship for the resumption of the student's university
tuition.212
5. Punitive Damages
Punitive or exemplary damages are generally unavailable in
international law, 2 13 although the case law does not exclude the

possibility.214 The term "reparation," of which compensation is one

209. See Bdimaca Velfisquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91, para. 69 (2002) (proposing that the victim's
wife receive damages as a result of the interruption in her life plan that the State
caused when it violated her husband's human rights).
210. See Hagler & Rivera, supra note 141, at 4 (noting that, to date, the Court
has not ordered compensation for destruction of a disappeared's life plan or for the
effect of the disappearance on the disappeared's family).
211. See id. (discussing the Commission's failed efforts to win compensation for
destruction of the victim's life plan in Bdmaca Veltisquez and other cases before
the Court).
212. See id. (explaining that the Court reasoned that the State should pay for the
victim's tuition when he returned to his studies so that the victim could continue to
develop his life plan).
213. See Re Letelier & Moffit, 88 INT'L L. REP. 727, 741 (1992) (stating that
international law h as not accepted the concept of punitive damages accepted as a
principle of international law). See generally Nina JOrgensen, A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 247 (1997)
(recounting the history and use of punitive damages in international law); Stephan
Wittich, Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests:Punitive Damages in the Law of
State Responsibility, 3 Aus. REV. INT'L & EURO. L. 101, 102 (1998) (citing the
International Law Commission's draft Articles on State Responsibility while
questioning whether punitive damages ought to be a part of international law).
214. See LUSITANIA CLAIMS, supra note 27, at 28 ("[lIt is not necessary for this
Commission to go to the length of holding that exemplary damages cannot be
awarded in any case by any international tribunal."); see also S.S. "I'm Alone"
(Can. v. U.S.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1609 (1935) (explaining the details of an agreement
between the United States and the United Kingdom dealing with U.S. rights of
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element, is by nature remedial in function rather than punitive.2 5
Domestic legal systems usually award punitive damages in cases of
"gross fraud, malice, willful negligence, or oppression. "216 There is
often (but not always) an absence of malice by states held
internationally responsible.217
Whiteman notes that while arbitrators have rarely awarded
punitive damages, diplomatic settlements have seemingly included
punitive elements in egregious cases. 21 This suggests that punitive
measures, if permissible at all, are a sovereign political function of
states rather than within the judicial remit of international tribunals.
As stated in the Lusitania cases: "as between sovereign nations, the
question of the right and power to impose penalties ... is political
rather than legal in its nature."2" 9 Theoretically, it is questionable
whether punitive damages are compatible with the general principle
of international law that no state has jurisdiction over another state
(par in parem non habet imperium). There is an associated difficulty
with the relationship between punitive damages and the vexed
question of state criminality in international law.
Gray suggests that in some personal injury and death casesalthough the relationship between injury and pecuniary
compensation is inevitably imprecise-the compensation amount
seems to be greater than expected; there is usually no explanation
given for apparent discrepancies.22 ° It may be that in such cases,
entry onto British sea vessels during the prohibition era, including a provision for
damages if the United States oversteps its authority); SHELTON, supra note 33, at
288-89 (discussing international law cases that have dealt with the issue of punitive
damages).
215. See LUsITANIA CLAIMS, supra note 27, at 5 (opining that "punitive
damages" is a misnomer and stating that "damages" refers to a loss actually
sustained).
216. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 716.
217. See id. (remarking that in many cases before international tribunals a nonstate actor initiates the wrong against the victim).
218. See id. at 722- 33 (describing historical examples of punitive damages
resulting from diplomatic settlements).
219. LUSITANIA CLAIMS, supra note 27, at 31.
220. See GRAY, supra note 66, at 27 (stating that awards sometimes seem to
represent more than just compensation but that it is impossible to identify if and to
what extent this is true).
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where an award contemplates the gravity of a state's acts, or
damages are awarded without evidence as to pecuniary loss, the
22
award is punitive in nature, "although not so denominated. '
Certainly there are cases in which the seriousness of the wrong - as
distinct from the seriousness of the injury ensuing from the wrong is a factor affecting quantification. 22 Shelton identifies a similar
possibility in the jurisprudence of the Court, in which "with a dual
focus on suffering of the victim and wrongfulness of government
conduct, it seems that moral damages may partially substitute for
punitive damages. 223
Exceptionally, U.S. courts have awarded punitive damages under
the special regime of the Alien Tort Claims Act in the United
States.224 In Filartigav. Pena-Irala, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York found that in international law cases
involving individual defendants, rather than states, "it [was] essential
and proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in order to give
effect to the manifest objectives of the international prohibition
against torture. 225 While acknowledging the rarity of punitive
damages in international law, the Court felt that cases involving
individuals did not give rise to the diplomatic and sovereignty issues
that characterized inter-state disputes. 2 6 The Court stated:
Punitive damages are designed not merely to teach a defendant not to
repeat his conduct but to deter others from following his example. To

221. Id.
222. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 223 n.573 (noting that international
tribunals have taken moral injury into account when granting pecuniary
compensation); see also WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 734-35 (describing how the
type of wrong that has occurred plays an either implicit or explicit role in
reparations decisions).
223. Shelton, supra note 50, at 171.
224. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(holding that where the defendant is an individual, as opposed to a sovereign state,
one can only realize international law's goal of making torture punishable as a
crime by awarding punitive damages).
225. Id. at 865.
226. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 84 (explaining that even though punitive
damages were not recoverable under Paraguayan law, because torture is a crime
that the world has condemned and seeks to deter, they were appropriate under
international law where the defendant was an individual rather than a state).
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accomplish that purpose this court must make clear the depth of the
international revulsion against torture and measure the award in
offense. Thereby the judgment may
accordance with the enormity of the
227
effect.
deterrent
some
have
perhaps

Similar tort cases have found punitive damages to be "proper
under the law of nations. 228
For its part, the Inter-American Court has held that "fair
compensation" in Article 63(1) is compensatory, not punitive,
explicitly rejecting the Anglo-American practice of awarding
exemplary or deterrent damages as not being part of international
law.2 29 The Court has stated that punitive damages are not in the
nature of its functions and are outside its power as a non-penal court,
whose primary function is to "repair" the effects of the violation
committed. 3 As the Court stated in the merits phase of the
Velsquez Rodriguez Case:
The international protection of human rights should not be confused with
criminal justice. States do not appear before the Court as defendants in a
criminal action. The objective of international human rights law is not to
punish those individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect

227. Filartiga,577 F. Supp. at 866.
228. Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C-87-2057-SC, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19470, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988) Punitive damages serve the purpose
of punishing the offender and deterring others and, therefore, in the case of torture,
furthering international human rights law. Id. at *5-6.
229. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 38 (1988) (holding that the principle of deterrence
associated with punitive damages is not currently applicable to international law);
see also Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 36 (1989) (using the same language as the
Veldsquez Rodriguez Case to explain that the reparations to injured parties under
international law do not include punitive damages); Garrido and Baigorria Case,
Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, paras. 43-44
(1998) (describing the court's power as limited to repairing the effects of the
violation committed, not awarding exemplary damages).
230. See Garridoand BaigorriaCase, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para.
43 (limiting awardable damages to those for damage done at the material and
moral levels).
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the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from
the acts .... 231

Although the Court does not use punitive damages as part of its

compensation awards, it has ordered broader reparations in particular
satisfaction.232 Such orders are consistent with the international case

law on state responsibility for wrongs against foreigners discussed
earlier,233 as well as consistent with the approach recommended by
Basic Principle 4 of the Basic Principles on Reparation:
Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law norms that
constitute crimes under international law carry the duty to prosecute
persons alleged to have committed these violations, to punish
perpetrators... and to cooperate with and assist States and appropriate
international judicial organs in the investigation and prosecution of these
violations.

234

6. Intrinsic Value of Life
The Court never has awarded compensation for the intrinsic value
of the life of a deceased, nor for the loss of enjoyment of life. 235 The
Umpire in the Lusitania cases consistently refused to award
compensation for the "value of the life taken," insisting that the
measure of damage was the pecuniary loss sustained by the claimant

231.

Vehsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 134.

232. See, e.g., Garridoand Baigorria Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39,
paras. 65, 91 (ordering the Argentine government to locate the heirs of the victim
of a government-sanctioned kidnapping); see also Aloeboetoe et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, para.
116 (1993) (requiring the government of Suriname, as an act of reparation, to
reopen and staff a school and medical facility in the village where the relatives of
seven victims of state torture and execution reside).
233. See supra Part A (discussing state responsibility for unlawful death, and
explaining that under international customary law, states are held responsible for
the unlawful deaths of foreigners within their jurisdiction).
234. See Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 7-8 (requiring states to pass
domestic laws providing universal jurisdiction for crimes under international law,
extradition, surrender, judicial assistance, and cooperation with other states).
235. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 229 (explaining that the Court accepted the
idea of awarding damages for the intrinsic value of life, what it called "proyecto de
vida", but it failed to make the actual award).
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as a result of the victim's death.236 Courts may fail to recognize the
difference between damages for the value of human life, as distinct
from the deceased's loss of earnings or moral suffering. 237 Economic
experts in the United States have used different risk-based

calculations to arrive at a figure of between U.S. $1.5 million and
U.S. $3 million per death, 238 but it is doubtful whether the very
diverse international arena will utilize the same calculations. 239
Some domestic jurisdictions have sought to quantify the "hedonic"
value of human life. In Sherrod v. Berry, a federal district court in
suggesting
testimony
economic
expert
accepted
Illinois
compensation for the expected pleasure of life and other values
beyond mere economic worth, and that this hedonic value of life
could be more than thirty times the mere economic value of a life. 4 °

Such a concept aims to quantify less tangible losses arising from
wrongful deaths.2 4' Shelton argues that the Court's acceptance of the
idea of "damage to a life plan" recognizes the hedonic value of
236. See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 705 (suggesting that one reason for
refusing to consider the victim's social, financial, and professional standing in the
assessment of damages is because the measure of the damage is not the value of
the life taken).
237. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 230 (describing the intrinsic value of life as
a "concept... linked to self-actualization of the person"). By contrast, damages
for moral suffering or loss of earnings focus on the impact of the wrongful death
on the victim's dependant and family. Id. at 262.
238. See id. at 246 (describing the various bases for the calculations such as the
value of life per year, studying the premiums people charge to incur small risks of
death or serious injury, and measuring the amount of money for which a person
would exchange their life).
239. See id. (explaining that the figures were determined by examining statistics
specific to the United States: wages and risks in different jobs, how much people
spend on safety related items, and the salary workers demand for high-risk jobs).
240. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd 827 F.2d
195 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that damages for hedonic value were appropriate in a
homicide case because, even though they are hard to measure, they are not
speculative). The issue of speculative damages arises when there is uncertainty as
to the cause of damage as opposed to uncertainty as to the measure or extent of
damage. Id. at 164.
241. See Thomas E. Courtney, Jr., Wrongful Death Damages in California: On
the Brink of Full Compensation, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1003, 1020 (1987)
(arguing that such hedonic damages are a "bold break from traditional assessment
of wrongful death damages," but will not be able to be applied in California the
same way they were applied in Illinois in Sherrod).
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life.242 However, "damage to a life plan" is arguably only one species
of hedonic value, since it focuses primarily on the victim's
professional or personal goals and aspirations, rather than on the
broader hedonic notion of valuing "the joy of watching children
grow, of sharing dinner with close friends, and other pleasures. 243
Inevitably there will be some difficulty in quantifying the financial
value of hedonic loss, and it invites endless technical disputes among
economic experts.244
Some international case law suggests that "when the official or
social position of the deceased is taken into consideration in setting
the amount of the indemnity we come very near, if not in fact, to
245
estimating the indemnity in terms of the 'value' of the life lost.
Whiteman argues, however, that it is "frequently impossible" to
discern the effect of a victim's official or social position on
compensation awards; awards are rarely made explicit and other
factors may explain the award. 246 For example, the award may be
influenced by gravity of the crime, the status of the perpetrators, the
greater earning power of the victim, or the position of the individual
as a protected person (such as attacks on diplomats, which goes to
the nature and gravity of the offence rather than to the value of the
life per se).2 47
As a policy matter, it is doubtful whether the official or social
position of the victim should have any bearing on compensation,

242. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 229, 245 (explaining that the Court
recognized the validity of hedonic damages in Loayza Tamayo). The Court's
assessment took into account the "vocation, skills, circumstances, potentialities,
and aspirations" that the deceased could have expected. Id. at 229-30.
243. Id. at 245.
244. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 246 (illustrating the potential difficulty in
calculating non-economic damages by describing some of the various methods
economists use to calculate the value of human life).
245. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 709.
246. See id. (explaining that factors other than the social position of the victim
may account for higher awards). Such factors include the gravity of the offenseespecially when an official of another state perpetrates the crime-and the
difference in earnings between a lower income and higher income victim. Id.
247. See id. (noting that an additional difficulty in assessing the impact of social
status on damage awards is the absence of cases with sufficiently similar facts
from which to draw comparisons).
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since doing so would import subjective social judgments of class and
taste into the law of reparations.248 Even where the deceased is an
internationally protected person, a victim's official status should not
increase compensation. 249 As the ILC notes, states may claim

compensation for personal injuries to its officials or nationals
separately from "any direct injury it may itself have suffered in
relation to the same event. ' 250 Thus, as a matter of law, perpetrator
states are responsible for the different effects of the same
internationally wrongful act; accordingly, one should assess
compensation separately.

IV. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
In international law, Gray notes that international awards for
personal injury and death generally lack uniformity. 2 1 Most
decisions give no explanation of the basis for the amount awarded.252
Whiteman observed earlier that:
[T]here is a very large personal element involved in the settlement of
practically every case. In the last analysis in each case someone must
make a decision in which he exercises considerable discretion. Even the
explanation of the reason for the award of a particular sum of money,
given, may not wholly explain the
though honestly and carefully
253
calculation of the indemnity.

248. See id. (expressing concern that when the Court considers the official or
social position of the victim in determining the amount of damages awarded, the
Court comes very close to estimating the "value" of the deceased's life).
249. Cf supra notes 247-248 (explaining that the Court should not consider
official status should in assessing damages because damages are meant to redress
the survivors' pecuniary loss, rather than assign value to the victim's life).
250. CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 223.
251. See GRAY, supra note 66, at 33, 37 (proposing that these inconsistencies
occur because the tribunal's criteria for assessing damages are too vague and
because the tribunal often fails to explain the basis of its awards, thus eroding any
value they many have as precedent).
252. See id. at 37 (arguing that the courts' failure to explain their bases for
awards leaves open the question of whether damages were determined according to
the loss suffered by the deceased or by his or her dependants).
253. WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 735.

AM. U.INT'L L. REV.

[19:523

Quantification of moral suffering especially is "inherently
subjective, '"254 and awards are frequently based on intangible factors
such as equity and fairness. 5 Moreover, the many unlawful death
cases resolved through international settlement rather than arbitration
frequently involve highly arbitrary amounts arrived at without any
reasoning,256 such that "it is useless to talk about principles adopted
in fixing the amount.

'25 7

As discussed earlier, the Court has

attempted to set out the basis for which compensation is measured
for material and moral damage in its judgments. It usually receives
competing submissions on various bases for quantifying
compensation from the Commission, the victims' representatives,
and the responsible state. In the past, the Court has utilized experts to
assist in determining the amount of compensation and costs.258 The
Court's judgments nonetheless demonstrate significant discretion in
awarding compensation amounts, although arguably less so than in
the ECHR.2 9 The Court has refused to use its own cases as

precedents in quantifying moral damages, reserving the right to
consider each case according to its unique circumstances. 260 The
Court also frequently takes into consideration equity, fairness, and
prudence in setting judgment amounts.

254. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 261 (recounting that because non-economic
damages are so difficult to measure due to their subjective nature, awards for
similar injuries vary widely).
255. See id. at 262 (noting that because of the uncertainty that courts face when
assessing non-monetary damages, some argue that courts should assess damages
by a set figure, such as unit of time or by how much a reasonable person would
have paid to avoid the injury-causing risk).
256. See generally WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 700-04, 736-45 (documenting
several cases in which awards for wrongful death were seemingly arbitrarily
determined, as the courts involved failed to cite any basis for the amounts).
257. Id. at 736.
258. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 161 (stating that the Court appoints experts
and sends its own Deputy Secretary to gather information regarding the economic,
financial, and banking situation of the country when fixing the amount of
compensation and costs).
259. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 264 (reporting that the ECHR damage
awards can only be understood as being subjective judgments "about the moral
worth of the victim and the wrongdoer").
260. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 167 (illustrating that the Court looks at each
case on its own facts and rejects using prior cases as precedent).
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Commentators have noted that the award amounts in recent cases
have been "modest 261 and that the Court has shown "less generosity
towards victims than one might expect based on the text of Article
63(1) and its legislative history. ' 62 For example, Shelton observed in
her writing in 1998 that:
[T]he Court has never awarded the full compensation it says is due under
the test it has articulated. The Court has consistently undervalued the loss
of human life, failing to include the monetary value of services rendered
time deducting one-quarter of
to the home and family while at the same
263
future earnings for "personal expenses."

The Court does not award separate compensation amounts for
each violation under the American Convention.264 Rather, the
compensation amount addresses the injury sustained. 265 Therefore, it
is often impossible to discern in unlawful death cases which violation
prompted the award because multiple violations may accompany one
another.266 The compensation amount is an aggregation of all the
rights violated, as the merits judgment.

261. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 224 (noting that the European and InterAmerican Courts of Human Rights have awarded or recommended only modest
amounts of compensation or damages).
262. See Shelton, supra note 80, at 153 (asserting that, considering the text of
Article 63(1) and its drafting history, the Court's jurisprudence on damages reveals
less generosity toward victims than one might otherwise expect).
263. Shelton, supra note 50, at 204.
264. See Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 47-50 (1993) (explaining that compensation is
made to repair the damage caused by the violations, and awarding compensation
for material and moral damages without specific reference to the several violations
in calculating those damages).
265. See, e.g., Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 47 (1998) (emphasizing that compensation is
made for the moral and material damages suffered by the victims).
266. See, e.g., Castillo Pdez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 3 (1998) (noting that Peru violated
Article 7 (right to personal liberty), 5 (right to humane treatment), 4 (right to life),
and 1(1) (right to effective recourse to a competent national court or tribunal) and
thus illustrating that several violations were evident in the case); Bdmaca
Veldsquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 91, para. 2 (2002) (recognizing that Guatemala violated Article 7 (right to
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Table A sets out what the Court awarded in major reparation cases
between 1989 and 2002, broken down into material damages, moral
damages, and expenses and costs. It also shows the percentage of the
total amount actually awarded that the Commission claimed during
the reparations phase.
Table A: Inter-American Court Reparations Judgments 19892002267

Case
Rodriguez
(1989)

Rights
Violated
on Merits

Material
Damages

Moral
Damages

Expenses
& Costs

Total
Award

% of
Claim

Honduras
violated
Arts 4, 5,
7
[1

L500,000

L250,000

Denied

L750,000

31%

L400,000

L250,000

Denied

L650,000

23%

$232,418

$213,175

$7,509

$453,102

18%

$370,332

$320,000

$32,000

$722,332

$88,040

$60,000

$6,000

$154,041

deceased]

Cruz
(1989)

Aloeboetoe
(1993)

Honduras
violated
Arts 4, 5,
7
[1
deceased]
Suriname
violated
Arts 1, 4,
5, 7, 25 [7
deceased]

El Amparo
(1996)

Venezuela
violated
Arts 1(1),
2,4,5,
8(l), 24,
25
[14
deceased,
2
1 survivors]

Alegria
(1996)

Peru
violated
Arts 4 &.7
[3

18%

deceased]

personal liberty), 5 (right to humane treatment), 4 (right to life), and 8 and 25 (the
right to fair trial and judicial protection)).
267. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 225 (indicating that all amounts were
rounded to the nearest U.S. dollar; for example, two lempiras were approximately
equal to one U.S. dollar).
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Delgado &
Santana
(1997)

Garrido &
Baigorria
(1998)

Pdez
(1998)

Panel
Blanca
(2001)

Street
Children
Case
(2001)

Barrios
Altos
(2001)

Durand &
Ugarte
(2001)

Oroza
(2002)

VelAsquez
(2002)
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Colombia
violated
Arts 2, 4,
5, 7, 8, 25
[2
deceased]
Argentina
violated
Arts I, 2,
4, 5, 7, 8,
25
[2
deceased]
Peru
violated
Arts 4, 5,
7
[1
deceased]
Guatemala violated
Arts 1, 4,
5, 7, 8, 25
[5
deceased]
Guatemala violated
Arts 1, 7,
4, 5, 7, 8,
19, 25 &
IATC
Arts 1, 6,
8
[5
deceased]
Peru
violated
Arts 1, 2,
4, 5, 8, 25
[14
deceased,
4
survivors]
Peru
violated
Arts 1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 8,
[2
25
deceased]
Bolivia
violated
Arts 1, 3,
4, 5, 7, 8,
25
[1
deceased]
Guatemala violated
Arts 1, 4,

$59,500

$30,000

$2,000

$91,500

17%

Denied

175,000

$45,500

$220,500

16%

$60,022

$160,000

$27,000

$247,022

18%

$278,345

$168,000

$20,000

$466,345

$140,764

$291,000

$51,102

$482,866

I
$700,000 to survivors
$2.52 million to
deceased

$125,000
(by agreement)

68%

$3.4 mill

N/A

$125,000

N/A

$130,000

$245,000

$32,400

$407,400

$225,000

$250,000

$23,000

$498,000
1
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5,7,8,25
& IATC
Arts 1, 2
6,8
[1
deceased]

From Table A, it is fair to say that up until at least 1997, total
awards were indeed modest. As a rough indication, simple
calculations from the Table below show that the average total award
per deceased victim (including material and moral damages and
expenses and costs) was U.S. $65,000 in Aloeboetoe,268 U.S. $67,000
in El Amparo, 269 U.S. $51,000 in Alegria,'2 0 and U.S. $46,000 in
Delgado and Santana.271 There is surprisingly little variation in these
awards, given that the victims lived in different states, had different

average wages, and had different numbers of relatives and
dependants. Exceptionally, the amounts awarded were significantly
higher in two earlier cases from 1989 - U.S. $375,000 in
Rodrguez272 and U.S. $325,000 in Cruz73 .

Since 1998, total awards increased above the early to mid-1990s
levels. The Court awarded over U.S. $110,000 per deceased victim in
2 74
Garrido and Baigorria,
U.S. $247,000 in Pclez,2 75 and U.S.

268. Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 2-5 (1993).
269. El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 3 (1996). The Court also awarded non-pecuniary
damages, including satisfaction of the victims by restoring their honor and
reputation, and a reformation of the Code of Military Justice. Id. para. 56.
270. Neira Alegria et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 3 (1996).
271. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Aug. 27,
1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 31, para. 2 (1998).
272. Velhsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4, para. 3 (1988).
273. Godinez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 12 (1989).
274. Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Aug. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 3 (1998).
275. Castillo Paez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 43, para. 118 (1998).
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$97,000 in the "Street Children" case,276 falling to U.S. $62,000 per
deceased in Durand and Ugarte.2 7 7 In BarriosAltos, 278 by agreement
between the parties, the beneficiaries of fourteen deceased victims
were each awarded U.S. $175,000, while the Court awarded
beneficiaries of one more deceased U.S. $250,000. By 2002, total
awards increased further. In Oroza, 79 the Court awarded
beneficiaries of a deceased U.S. $407,000, while in Btimaca
Velcsquez 280 the award was U.S. $498,000 for one deceased. Over
time, the Court seemed to become more generous and was coming
closer to the view that compensation for unlawful death "should
always exceed those awarded in cases of lesser injury, to avoid
making it cheaper for the state to kill the individual than to keep him
or her alive."28'
There is notable consistency in many of the judgments in the
percentage of the amount claimed by the Commission that was
actually awarded by the Court. For example, in the cases of
Aloeboetoe, Alegria, Delgado and Santana, Garrido and Baigorria
and Ptiez, the Court awarded between sixteen and eighteen percent of
the total amount the Commission claimed in its submissions on
reparations. Such consistency across diverse claims is indeed
remarkable and there are a number of possible explanations. It may
suggest that the Commission, or through it the victims, consistently
exaggerate loss and make inflated claims for compensation. More
likely is that the Court consistently discounts claims by over eighty
percent, for unexplained reasons. It was only in the early cases of
Rodriguez and Cruz that the proportion of the claim amount awarded
was higher, reaching thirty-one percent and twenty-three percent
276. "Street Children" Case, Reparations, Judgment of May 26, 2001, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 77, para. 54 (2001).
277. Durand and Ugarte Case, Reparations, Judgment of Dec. 3, 2001, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 89, para. 45 (2001).
278. Barrios Altos Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 30, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 87, para. 3 (2001).
279. Trujillo Oroza Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 27, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 92, para. 46 (2002).
280. Bdmaca Veldsquez Case, Reparations, Judgment of Feb. 22, 2002, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91, para. 20 (2002).
281. See Shelton, supra note 50, at 206 (asserting that the Commission and the
Court should avoid giving the state incentives to hide the truth).
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respectively. In the recent "Street Children" death case, however,
the Court awarded sixty-eight percent of the amount claimed by the
Commission. Previously the Court awarded such a high percentage
of the claim only in personal injury cases not involving death, such
as in Tamayo (seventy-one percent) 282 and Rosero (104%).283
It is worthwhile to place the amounts of compensation awarded by
the Court in unlawful death cases into a comparative context. In spite
of the apparent modesty of its awards, the Court's awards have been
more generous than awards for serious personal injury or death
resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, issued by
the U.N. Compensation Commission ("UNCC") in the 1990s.
Category B claims in the UNCC covered individuals who suffered
"serious personal injury 28 4 or whose spouse, child, or parent died
during the conflict. Decision 8 of the UNCC Governing Council
capped compensation at U.S. $15,000 (or U.S. $30,000 for a family)
for the death of a spouse, child, or parent.2 85 The Commission
concluded the Category B claims processing program in December
1995.286 Out of 6,000 claims seeking U.S. $21 million in total, the

282. See Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of November 27, 1998,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 71 (1998) (stating that the victim was
unlawfully detained and tortured and has since been released from prison).
283. See Suarez Rosero Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1999, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44, para. 34 (1999) (noting that the victim was
incarcerated and received beatings and other inhumane treatment during that time).
284. See Whelton, supra note 29, at 620 (describing "serious personal injury" as
dismemberment; permanent or temporary significant disfigurement, or loss or
limitation of use of a bodily organ, member, function or system; or any injury
which, left untreated, is unlikely to result in full recovery). Additionally, the
UNCC includes physical or mental injury sustained from sexual assault, torture,
aggravated assault, hostage taking or hiding in its definition of "serious personal
injury." Id.
285. See Determination of Ceilings for Compensation for Mental Pain and
Anguish, U.N. Compensation Commission, 4th Sess., 22d Mtg., at 2, UN Doc.
S/AC.26 (1992) (providing applicable ceiling amounts available to claimants for
compensation for mental pain and anguish in different situations).
286. See United Nations Compensation Comm'n, Category "B" Claims (stating
that the Commission concluded the category "B" claims in December 1995), at
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/claims/bclaims.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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UNCC made 3,945 awards worth U.S. $13.5 million. 287 As of
January 22, 2004, of the U.S. $18 billion paid out to claimants, only
$13.5 million was allocated to pay all Category B claims. 88 As a
policy matter, the UNCC appears to prefer compensating property
losses while capping death claims at the fairly low level of U.S.
$15,000.
Until recently, the ECHR had seldom compensated personal injury
or death. 289 Following a raft of judgments against Turkey and the
United Kingdom since 1998, an emerging jurisprudence has
developed. Table B shows major awards for violations of the right to
life (Article 2 of the European Convention) by the ECHR between
1998 and 2002.

287. See id. (illustrating that the Commission received approximately 6,000
category "B" claims from forty-seven governments and seven offices of three
international organizations).
288. See United Nations Compensation Comm'n, Status of Claims Processing
(listing categories of claims the Commission heard and resolved, and award
amounts actually paid), at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/status.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2004).
289. See SHELTON, supra note 33, at 250 (implying that the European Court has
not addressed issues of measuring damages for personal injury and wrongful
death); see also GRAY, supra note 66, at 157 (stating that the European Court often
awards compensation for moral injury and rejects those claims where injury cannot
be proved).
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TABLE B: ECHR COMPENSATION AWARDS - ARTICLE 2 (RIGHT TO
LIFE) - 1998-2002290
ECHR Case
Gileq
v
Turkey (1998)
(akici
v
Turkey (1999)
Salman
v
Turkey (2000)
Timurtas
v
Turkey (2000)
Akkoq
v
Turkey (2000)
Tas
v
Turkey (2000)
Demiray
v
Turkey (2000)
Gil
v
Turkey (2000)
Ertak
v
Turkey (2000)
Qiqekv
Turkey (2001)
Tanli
v
Turkey (2001)
Jordan
v
UK (2001)
McKerr
v

Material

Moral

Expenses &

Total

Costs 291

292

-

50,000

10,000

60,000

11,534

27,500

58,330

39,321

35,000

-

30,000

35,000

40,000

-

30,000

20,000, less
FF7,000
21,545 less
FF 11,195
20,000 less
FF 10,245
13,648 less
FF3,600
14,795 less
FF9,700
US$2,000 less
FF3,700
21,000

US$40,000

94,742
48,971
88,286
44,433
24,303

35,000

30,000

15,000

22,500

10,000

50,000

12,000 less FF
14,660
10,000

38,755

30,000

12,000

70,000 [2
deceased]
80,755

-

10,000

30,000

40,000

-

10,000

25,000"

35,000

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

-

10,000

30,000

40,000

362,340

202,500

26,600 less
FF 17,500

589,683 [9
deceased]

86,000
48,028

UK (2001)
Shanaghan
v
UK (2001)
Kelly et al. v
UK (2001)
Akdeniz
v
Turkey (2001)

290. The information compiled in this chart is from cases that one may access in
the European Human Rights Reports.
291. The costs for legal aid are not included because the Council of Europe has
already paid it.
292. The ECHR most commonly makes compensation awards in British Pounds

(.). The author has converted compensation amounts awarded in other currencies
into the British Pounds for simplicity of comparison (currency conversion done on
Jan. 17, 2003).
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Material

Moral

Expenses &

Total

Costs

v
Orak
Turkey (2002)
Edwards v UK
(2002)
Semse Onen v
Turkey (2002)
v
McShane
UK (2002)
Anguelovav
Bulgaria
(2002)
Orhan
v
Turkey (2002)
v
Oneryildiz
Turkey (2002)
Ulkil Ekinci v

E2,660 less
FF4,100
20,000

46,666

8,000

17,500 less
E 1,744
8,000

111,305 [3
deceased]
16,000

-

C19,050

E3,500

14,032

30,000

£60,900

29,000 less
£2,455
E10,000 less
E2,287
5,201

95,747 [3
deceased]
100,630 [12
deceased]
4,978

E46,457

E26,500

-

20,000

-

C149,000

-

£154,000 for 13 deceased
£15,590

40,000

Turkey (2002)

It is clear from the cases cited in Table B that the Inter-American
Court has given compensatory relief roughly equivalent to that given
by the ECHR. Recent awards in the ECHR range from a low of
£5,000 (U.S. $8,090),293 to a typical mid-range award of £40,000
295
(U.S. $64,705),294 to a high award of £95,000 (US$153,670).

293. See Olkii Ekinci v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27602/95, paras. 10-12, 19,
180 (2002) (describing Ekinci's disappearance, how his body was found the next
day with eleven bullets in it), http://www.ehcr.coe.int/eng (last visited Feb. 6,
2004); see also Oneryildiz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 48939/99, para. 17 (2002)
(recounting how a methane explosion caused a landslide, destroying ten slum
dwellings and killing thirty-nine people, nine of which were of the Oneryildiz
family), http://www.ehcr.coe.int/eng (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
294. See Edwards v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 487, 520 (2002)
(awarding £20,000 for non-pecuniary damage and £20,000 for costs and expenses);
see also Orak v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 31889/96, para. 114 (2002) (awarding
E26,500 for non-pecuniary damage*and £2,660 less FF4,100 for costs and
expenses), http://www.echr.coe.int/fr (last visited Feb. 6, 2004); Jordan v. United
Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, 103 (2003) (awarding £10,000 for non-pecuniary
damage and £30,000 for costs and expenses); McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 553, 600 (2002) (awarding £10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and
£25,000 for costs and expenses); Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No.
37715/97, para. 150 (2001) (awarding o10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and
-20,000 for costs and expenses), http://www.ehcr.coe.int/eng (last visited Feb. 6,
2004); Kelly v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30054/96, para. 170 (2001)
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Though the cost of living in Europe and South America differs, a
comparison is instructive for two reasons. First, many of the death
cases in the ECHR involve Turkey, which has a lower cost of living
than much of Europe and is comparable to Latin and South America.
Second, death cases involving the United Kingdom ("U.K"), where
the cost of living is higher, have not involved awards for loss of
wages because contribution to dependants has not been proven.
Accordingly, awards were not inflated by higher U.K. wages. In any
event, the most recent awards in the Inter-American Court for
unlawful death have been markedly higher than those in the ECHR.

CONCLUSION
The reparations decisions of the Court have made an enduring
contribution to the international case law on compensation for
unlawful death. Its jurisprudence has consolidated the applicability
of the rules of state responsibility to the field of international human
rights law, expanding the limited international legal personality of
individuals. It has sought to entrench the primacy of restitutio in
integrum in the law of reparations, helping to dispel lingering doubts
about the status of that remedy. At the same time, the Court has
emphasized that restitution may be impossible or inadequate in cases
of serious human rights violations, particularly concerning unlawful
death.2 96 In such cases, the Court has routinely ordered compensation
for material and moral damage, 'becoming more generous in its
awards over time.2 97 The Court also has given serious consideration
to broader heads of damage, such as damage to a life plan and the

(awarding -10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and -30,000 for costs and expenses),
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
295. See Salman v. Turkey, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 425, 491 (2002) (awarding
£39,320.64 for pecuniary damage, £35,000 for non-pecuniary damage, and
£21,544 for costs and expenses).
296. See supra Part C.2 (suggesting that restitutio in integrum is impossible in
cases of unlawful death because the victim cannot enjoy the right to life, and thus
compensation is granted for damages suffered by the injured parties).
297. See supra Part C.2 (a)-(b) (describing how material and moral damages are
computed and commenting that they may include loss of wages and emotional or
psychological damage).
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nuclear family's patrimonial damages.298 It has, however, refrained
from compensating the intrinsic value of life or hedonic damages.2 99
The Court has forcefully demonstrated the invaluable contribution
that regional enforcement mechanisms can make to the consolidation
and progressive development of international law.

298. See supra Part C.2 (d) (explaining that though the Court has contemplated
awarding damages based on the loss of a life plan, the Court seldom makes awards
in this category).
299. See supra Part C.2 (f) (questioning how the Court would actually calculate
the hedonic value of life or the value of the life lost, as it is a subjective judgment).

